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INTRODUCTION 
he Indian Constitution contains “Directive Principles of 
State Policy”1 that require the state to pursue socioeco-
nomic justice.2 These principles are explicitly nonjusticiable 
under the Constitution.3 However, the Indian Supreme Court 
(“Supreme Court” or “Court”) has interpreted the right to life 
under Article 21 of the Constitution to protect a right to “live 
with dignity.”4 It has since held that directive principles per-
taining, inter alia, to food, shelter, and a decent livelihood are 
essential to human dignity and are therefore judicially enforce-
able rights.5 
Much scholarship has been devoted to the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area, focusing mostly on the judiciary’s 
role in a constitutional democracy. These works either criticize 
                                                                                                                                  
* Assistant Professor and Executive Director of Centre for Public Interest 
Law, Jindal Global Law School, National Capital Region of Delhi, India. J.D. 
(Harvard), A.B. (Brown). I am very grateful to Professor Frank Michelman, 
whose class on Rawls & Constitutionalism inspired this paper, and whose 
insightful comments on an earlier draft benefitted me greatly. I am also in-
debted to many colleagues and friends who offered helpful comments, includ-
ing Jonathan Gingerich, Dipika Jain, Rajeev Kadambi, Shivprasad Swamina-
than, and Ashwini Vasanthakumar. Finally, I thank Nisha Raman for excel-
lent research assistance and the editors of the Brooklyn Journal of Interna-
tional Law for their thoughtful and thorough edits. 
 1. Directive principles include, inter alia, working toward providing free 
education and improving nutritional standards. See INDIA CONST. arts. 36–51. 
 2. “Socioeconomic justice” broadly refers to what Professor Michelman 
describes as “social rights” or policies aimed at the “satisfaction of certain 
material needs or wants, or access to the means of satisfaction.” Such rights 
or policies include the provision or access to a minimum adequate standard of 
living, food, and shelter. See generally Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, 
Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, in EXPLORING SOCIAL 
RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 21–24 (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal 
M. Gross eds., 2007). 
 3. See INDIA CONST. art. 37 (stating that directive principles “shall not be 
enforceable by any court”). 
 4. See Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 518 
(India). 
 5. A “right” refers to a constitutionally recognized, judicially enforceable 
restraint on popular government. See generally Mahendra P. Singh, Constitu-
tionalization and Realization of Human Rights in India, in HUMAN RIGHTS, 
JUSTICE & CONSTITUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT (C. Raj Kumar & K. Chockalingam 
eds., 2007). 
T
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the Court for “judicial activism” or applaud it for proactively 
defending the rights of the poor and marginalized.6 
This Article analyzes socioeconomic rights in India from a 
Rawlsian perspective, which illuminates a neglected aspect of 
this debate. While addressing concerns of judicial overreach, I 
argue that the Supreme Court’s reasoning for locating justicia-
ble socioeconomic rights in the Indian Constitution raises a 
more fundamental concern: it threatens the Constitution’s le-
gitimacy. 
The Article has five parts. Part I sets forth the theoretical 
framework, which is grounded in John Rawls’s liberal principle 
of legitimacy. This principle states that political power is justi-
fied only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution 
that all citizens would accept assuming they are rationally self-
interested and reasonable.7 It then discusses Professor Frank 
Michelman’s recent work, which draws on Rawlsian theory to 
examine what makes a constitution legitimate in a liberal 
state. 
In The Constitution, Social Rights and Liberal Political Justi-
fication, Michelman questions the wisdom of conferring consti-
tutional status on socioeconomic rights.8 He makes a positive 
case for including socioeconomic rights in a constitution, which 
must overcome two major objections.9 The first is a “democratic 
objection,” where broad “social citizenship rights” would leave 
“no leading issue . . . untouched” in the political sphere.10 Imag-
                                                                                                                                  
 6. Compare Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, 18 J. 
DEMOCRACY 70 (2007) and Raju Ramachandran, The Supreme Court and the 
Basic Structure Doctrine, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE 107 (B.N. Kirpal et 
al. eds., 2000) (criticizing the Indian Supreme Court’s excessive use of judicial 
review) with Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litiga-
tion in the Supreme Court of India, 4 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107 (1985) 
(commending the Court for becoming a more populist “Supreme Court for 
Indians”) and Vijayashri Sripati, Human Rights in India—Fifty Years after 
Independence, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 93, 136 (1997) (defending the 
Court’s “activism” for recognizing an “impressive array of Fundamental 
Rights”). 
 7. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 28; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 217 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. 
 8. See Michelman, supra note 2. While Michelman uses the term “social 
rights,” this paper refers to the same set of rights as “socioeconomic rights” to 
convey a broader understanding of their scope and impact. 
 9. Id. at 23–24. 
 10. Id. at 30–33. 
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ine a constitution that includes enforceable rights to housing, 
food, and clean water. Such a constitution would constrain poli-
cy choices in any area involving the allocation and distribution 
of resources, including taxation, trade, immigration, and edu-
cation. In extreme cases, representative democracy would be 
rendered meaningless, as elected representatives would not be 
able to make “the most basic choices of political economy.”11 
Conferring constitutional status on socioeconomic rights also 
invites a “contractarian objection.”12 Social contractarians be-
lieve that a constitution is legitimate if rational citizens, acting 
reasonably, can understand its terms and agree to be governed 
by them.13 To accept a constitution’s terms, citizens must be 
able to determine whether their government actually abides by 
constitutional principles. If they cannot make this determina-
tion, they may not regard the constitution as a legitimate “ba-
sis for political rule.”14 
However, it is difficult to gauge if a government fulfills socio-
economic rights. Take, for instance, the right to adequate hous-
ing. What if the government provides free housing to 90% of 
those living in poverty? Does it therefore “violate” this right 
vis-à-vis the remaining 10%? Because socioeconomic rights re-
quire positive action by the government, including the provi-
sion of entitlements, the extent to which the government “com-
plies” with these rights depends on an individual citizen’s 
views of distributive justice. This sort of indeterminacy is po-
tentially fatal for contractarian legitimacy, as citizens cannot 
determine when their government violates socioeconomic 
rights.15 Rawls avoids this difficulty by defining a legitimate 
constitutional scheme as one that includes certain constitu-
tionally essential civil and political rights.16 Judicial and policy 
decisions with respect to socioeconomic rights are held to a 
lesser standard—what Rawls referred to as the “constraint of 
public reason.”17 
                                                                                                                                  
 11. Id. at 33. 
 12. Id. at 35–37. 
 13. Id. at 35. 
 14. See id. at 36. 
 15. See id. at 36. 
 16. Id. at 38. 
 17. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 90 (Erin Kelly ed., 
2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS]; RAWLS, POLITICAL 
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Part II describes the drafting and enactment of the Indian 
Constitution. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, which is silent on 
the issue of socioeconomic justice, or the South African Consti-
tution, which enumerates justiciable socioeconomic rights,18 
India’s Constitution takes a middle ground. It does not contain 
enforceable socioeconomic rights, but includes instead “Di-
rective Principles of State Policy.”19 The framers of the Indian 
Constitution placed fundamental rights and directive princi-
ples in Part III and Part IV of the Constitution, respectively.20 
They empowered the Supreme Court to enforce fundamental 
rights through Article 32,21 but specified in Article 37 that di-
rective principles are not justiciable.22 Nevertheless, these 
principles “give a certain inflection to political public reason” to 
guide legislators toward the progressive realization of socioeco-
nomic justice.23 
Giving socioeconomic guarantees this nonjusticiable status 
should have avoided both the democratic and contractarian ob-
jections. When directive principles do not legally bind elected 
officials, but guide them toward improving socioeconomic con-
ditions, then no serious democratic objection arises. And, if rep-
resentatives make policy decisions reflecting their honest 
judgment of how to best pursue socioeconomic justice and they 
are willing to fully and transparently explain their votes to cit-
izens—that is, they fulfill the constraint of public reason—then 
                                                          
LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 214–17 (explaining that public reason requires 
citizens [including elected representatives and judges] to present publicly 
acceptable reasons to each other for their views, at least with regard to basic 
justice [which includes socioeconomic justice] and constitutional essentials. 
Citizens must also be willing to “listen to others” and display “fair-
mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasona-
bly be made”). 
 18. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 26, 27. 
 19. See INDIA CONST. arts. 38–47. 
 20. See INDIA CONST. arts. 12–51. See also GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN 
CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION 50–83 (1966) [hereinafter AUSTIN, 
THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION]. 
 21. See INDIA CONST. art. 32 (guaranteeing the right of individual citizens 
“to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement 
of [fundamental] . . . rights”). 
 22. Id. art. 37. 
 23. Michelman, supra note 2, at 39. 
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the contractarian objection does not arise.24 In practice, though, 
India’s constitutional experience has given rise to both objec-
tions. 
Part III surveys the evolving constitutional status of socioec-
onomic rights. Over the past forty years, the Indian Supreme 
Court has moved away from its early precedents and under-
standing of the Indian Constitution. It has ruled that the Con-
stitution confers on citizens enforceable socioeconomic rights 
that, if violated, can be redressed in court. Under this prevail-
ing interpretation, India faces serious democratic and contrac-
tarian objections to its basic constitutional framework. 
Part IV discusses the democratic objection in light of the In-
dian Supreme Court rulings on socioeconomic rights. The Court 
has required both central and state governments to adopt spe-
cific distributive policies.25 These include giving mid-day meals 
to schoolchildren, improving the public food supply distribution 
system, and providing shelter, food, and sanitation to the 
homeless.26 
This robust exercise of judicial review prevents elected offi-
cials from deliberating, negotiating, and crafting policies con-
cerning socioeconomic justice. The Court does not simply de-
clare socioeconomic policies unconstitutional, but creates and 
enforces its own policy solutions.27 In several cases, the Court 
has essentially dictated policies to elected officials that allocate 
resources to assist disadvantaged communities. It has even in-
stituted timelines for the completion of these policies, which it 
enforces through interim orders.28 This sort of policymaking is 
precisely what the democratic objection opposes, as it appears 
to seriously undermine representative democracy. 
For Rawls, however, a robust form of judicial review might be 
acceptable in some societies. He stated that judicial review “can 
                                                                                                                                  
 24. Id. at 37–38; see also RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 
89–94. 
 25. See, e.g., PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) 
(India). 
 26. See Lauren Birchfield & Jessica Corsi, Between Starvation and Global-
ization: Realizing the Right to Food in India, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 691, 694, 
700 (2010); Singh, supra note 5, at 35. 
 27. See, e.g., Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 (India). 
 28. See id.; PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) 
(India). 
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perhaps be defended given certain historical circumstances and 
conditions of political culture.”29 India is beset with such chron-
ic inequality, poverty, and malnourishment that its elected 
representatives have been unable or unwilling to improve,30 
leaving the Supreme Court to remedy these conditions. In other 
words, justice might require the Court’s intrusion into matters 
usually assigned to the elected branches given these political 
and historical circumstances. 
Part V addresses the contractarian objection to justiciable so-
cioeconomic rights in India. Article 21 of the Indian Constitu-
tion states, “No person shall be deprived of his life . . . except 
according to procedure established by law.”31 The Indian Su-
preme Court has held that socioeconomic guarantees are judi-
cially enforceable by interpreting this provision to encompass a 
broader right to “live with dignity.”32 It has since held that 
rights to adequate food, education, and shelter, inter alia, are 
essential for citizens to live with dignity and are justiciable un-
der Art. 21.33 
Through this capacious reading of Article 21, the Indian Su-
preme Court has essentially shoehorned socioeconomic guaran-
tees into a “constitutionally essential” civil right. This judicial 
sleight of hand makes the right to life indeterminate under the 
Indian Constitution, as a right to “live with dignity” could ex-
tend to a range of guarantees that rational citizens could not 
reasonably foresee and therefore could not endorse. More trou-
blingly, the Court does not explain how it gets past the clear 
textual command in Article 37 of the Constitution, which plain-
ly states that directive principles “shall not be enforceable by 
any court.”34 
                                                                                                                                  
 29. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 240. 
 30. See, e.g., Jean Dreze, Democracy and the Right to Food, 39 ECON. & 
POL. WKLY. 1723 (2004). 
 31. INDIA CONST. art. 21. 
 32. See Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 529 
(India). 
 33. See PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (In-
dia); Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 S.C.R. 594, 700–01 (India); Tel-
lis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 2 S.C.R. Supp. 51, 83 (India). 
 34. INDIA CONST. art. 37. 
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Rawls called the Supreme Court the “exemplar of public rea-
son”35 to convey that it has a greater obligation than other 
branches of government to justify its decisions with transpar-
ent and clearly articulated reasons that are acceptable to all 
rational and reasonable citizens. When it fails to set forth such 
reasons, as with its expansive interpretation of Article 21, citi-
zens might not assent to be governed by the Constitution, as 
they could not know with any clarity or certainty what this 
constitutionally essential right requires and therefore could not 
determine if it is being met. 
The Article concludes by highlighting some analytical in-
sights into Indian Constitutional law that emerge from its the-
oretical framework. It also suggests that a legitimate constitu-
tional system requires more than acceptable institutional ar-
rangements that allow for desirable political outcomes—it de-
mands honesty and clarity in the reasoning employed by public 
institutions on matters of basic justice and constitutional es-
sentials. 
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Justice as Fairness 
This Article is grounded in John Rawls’s theory of justice as 
fairness that he articulated in A THEORY OF JUSTICE and re-
fined in his later work.36 Justice as fairness rests on three basic 
premises. First, it is framed for a democratic society—a society 
that has a “fair system of social cooperation between citizens 
regarded as free and equal.”37 Here, Rawls adopts a “thick” 
conception of democracy, beyond mere majoritarian democracy. 
He describes the idea of society as a fair system of social coop-
eration that has at least three essential features: (1) social co-
operation is guided by publicly recognized rules and proce-
dures, and not simply socially coordinated activity; (2) social 
cooperation involves fair terms of cooperation that each partic-
ipant should accept, provided everyone else accepts them, and 
includes an idea of reciprocity wherein participants that follow 
                                                                                                                                  
 35. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 231. 
 36. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999); RAWLS, 
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17. 
 37. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 39. 
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the established rules benefit in a manner specified by a public 
and agreed-upon standard; (3) social “cooperation also includes 
the idea of each participant’s rational advantage, or good. The 
idea of rational advantage specifies what it is that those en-
gaged in cooperation are seeking to advance” in terms of their 
own good.38 By “free and equal persons,” Rawls means, “in vir-
tue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense of justice 
and for a conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of 
judgment, thought, and inference connected with these pow-
ers), persons are free.”39 He assumes here that citizens have 
“these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully co-
operating members of society,” which makes them equal.40 
A second premise of justice as fairness is that it considers the 
basic structure of society as the “primary subject of political 
justice.”41 In other words, it focuses on political and social insti-
tutions and “how they fit into one unified system of coopera-
tion.”42 These institutions include the political constitution, in-
dependent judiciary, economic institutions such as competitive 
markets, and the family.43 The basic structure, then, “is the 
background social framework” within which all of society’s in-
dividual and collective activities take place.44 
The third premise is that justice as fairness is a form of polit-
ical liberalism that aims to justify the coercion of the state over 
free and equal citizens in society.45 This is a difficult task be-
cause of the “fact of reasonable pluralism”—the fact that citi-
zens in any democratic society hold a diverse range of reasona-
ble, comprehensive doctrines.46 Rawls asks, if reasonable plu-
ralism always exists, and political power in a democracy is the 
collective power of free and equal citizens, on what basis can 
citizens (through their elected representatives) legitimately ex-
ercise coercive power over their fellow citizens?47 
                                                                                                                                  
 38. Id. at 6. 
 39. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 18–19. 
 40. Id. at 19. 
 41. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 10. 
 42. Id. at 40. 
 43. Id. at 10. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See generally id. at 18–24, 40. 
 46. Id. See also RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 58–66. 
 47. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 40–41. 
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The answer for Rawls is the liberal principle of legitimacy.48 
The principle holds that “political power is legitimate only 
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution (written 
or unwritten) the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable 
and rational, can endorse in light of their common human rea-
son.”49 In determining what these “constitutional essentials” 
might be, and in addressing questions of basic justice, Rawls 
argues that we should only appeal to principles that all citizens 
could rationally and reasonably endorse.50 
Rawls set forth an elaborate thought experiment to deduce 
these principles. He begins with the “original position,” where 
representatives of a society convene to decide upon its basic 
constitutional structure. These representatives are normal co-
operating members of society who, despite differences in ability 
and socioeconomic standing, are free and equal in their ability 
to exercise their two moral powers to at least the requisite min-
imum degree.51 Representatives negotiate the basic structure 
behind a “veil of ignorance [where they] . . . are not allowed to 
know” their social positions or the comprehensive doctrines of 
the individuals they represent.52 The “veil” also prevents repre-
sentatives from knowing their constituents’ sex, race, ethnic 
group, strength, intelligence, and other “native endowments.”53 
When choosing which principles to adopt, representatives are 
limited to the same body of general facts and the same infor-
mation about the “general circumstances of society.”54 Under 
these constraints, representatives deliberate from an equal po-
sition and under fair terms of social cooperation to agree on 
                                                                                                                                  
 48. See id. at 41. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 41, 6–7 (“[R]easonable persons are ready to propose, or to 
acknowledge when proposed by others, the principles needed to specify what 
can be seen by all as fair terms of cooperation. Reasonable persons also un-
derstand that they are to honor these principles, even at the expense of their 
own interests.”) (emphasis added); id. at 7 (“[I]t may be that some have a su-
perior political power or are placed in more fortunate circumstances . . . it 
may be rational for those so placed to take advantage of their situation . . . 
but unreasonable all the same.”) (emphasis added). 
 51. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 22–28. 
 52. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 15. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 86–87. 
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principles of political justice for the basic structure—put oth-
erwise, justice as fairness.55 
What emanates from the original position is one of Rawls’s 
most seminal contributions: the two principles of justice that 
specify basic rights and liberties and regulate economic and 
social inequalities in the basic structure.56 The first principle 
holds that “[e]ach person has the same indefeasible claim to a 
fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is 
compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.”57 For 
Rawls, the first principle is constitutionally essential,58 mean-
ing that the liberal principle of legitimacy cannot be satisfied if 
a society’s basic law—its Constitution—does not meet the crite-
ria of the first principle. 
The first principle of justice requires that democratic socie-
ties put in place a basic set of fundamental rights available to 
all citizens. These rights include the “freedom of thought and 
liberty of conscience[,] political liberties” (such as the right to 
vote), freedom of association, rights and liberties associated 
with the integrity of the person, and the rights and liberties 
specified by the rule of law.59 It also includes a “social mini-
mum” to be provided to all citizens.60 This list is neither exclu-
sive nor exhaustive. Rawls merely specifies a minimal set of 
fundamental rights with which any just society must abide, but 
leaves it to individual societies to work out the specific contours 
of those rights. Imagine, for instance, two democratic societies 
that constitutionally protect the right to free speech, but the 
first prohibits hate speech, while the second does not. The 
scope of this fundamental right is therefore broader in the sec-
ond society than the first. Still, the restriction on free speech in 
                                                                                                                                  
 55. Id. at 16, 87. 
 56. Id. at 41–42. 
 57. Id. at 42. 
 58. Id. at 46. 
 59. Id. at 44. 
 60. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 166, 228–29 (noting 
that it is constitutionally essential for the state to provide a “social minimum” 
providing for satisfaction of citizens’ “basic” material needs to the extent re-
quired to enable them to take effective part in political and social life). 
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the first society is reasonable and does not necessarily violate 
the first principle.61 
The second principle of justice requires that “[s]ocial and eco-
nomic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are 
to be attached to offices and positions open to all under condi-
tions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be 
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of soci-
ety.”62 The first clause requires formal equality—that is, there 
should be no discrimination in the selection process for public 
offices and social positions. It also requires that all citizens 
have a “fair chance” to attain these offices or positions.63 The 
second clause, commonly referred to as the “difference princi-
ple,” essentially imposes a distributive policy on society. When 
tackling social and economic inequality, this principle requires 
society to distribute resources to the greatest benefit of its least 
privileged members.64 
Crucially, for the purposes of this Article, Rawls does not 
consider the second principle of justice—which concerns socio-
economic justice—constitutionally essential.65 He specified that 
the first principle is prior to the second not only in his taxono-
my, but also in terms of importance and application.66 The sec-
ond principle is only to be implemented within a setting of 
background institutions created by a constitution, whose essen-
tials are set out in the first principle.67 Therefore, the first 
principle must be fully satisfied before the application of the 
second principle.68 
The two principles are also to be applied at different stages of 
a society’s development. The first principle applies “at the stage 
of the constitutional convention,” as it is “more urgent” to settle 
                                                                                                                                  
 61. See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1597 (2010) (noting that democratic states such as 
England, Canada, France, Denmark, Germany, and New Zealand all prohibit 
hate speech, while the United States does not; and, drawing on Rawlsian the-
ory, arguing that hate speech regulation is compatible with democratic legit-
imacy). 
 62. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 42–43. 
 63. Id. at 43. 
 64. Id. at 52. 
 65. See id. at 46. 
 66. See id. at 43, 46–47. 
 67. Id. at 46. 
 68. Id. at 46–47. 
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constitutional essentials than to determine policies of economic 
and social justice.69 In contrast, the second principle applies “at 
the legislative stage and it bears on all kinds of social and eco-
nomic legislation, and on the many kinds of issues arising at 
this point.”70 This lag in the application of the second principle 
stems not only from Rawls’s view that the constitutional essen-
tials of the first principle are more important than the distribu-
tive justice required by the second principle, but also from his 
belief that “[i]t is far easier to tell whether . . . [constitutional] 
essentials are realized.”71 He noted a crucial difference between 
the principles is that while “it seems possible to gain agree-
ment on what . . . [constitutional] essentials should be,” the re-
alization of the second principle is “always open to reasonable 
differences of opinion . . . [it] depend[s] on inference and judg-
ment in assessing complex social and economic information.”72 
Here, Rawls seems to have anticipated the contractarian ob-
jection to placing economic and social rights within a constitu-
tion.73 Recognizing that rational citizens, acting reasonably, 
will likely disagree on the appropriate allocation and distribu-
tion of resources, Rawls defers decisions of socioeconomic jus-
tice to the legislative process.74 At that point, a society’s basic 
constitutional structure is in place, including a political frame-
work that can effectively tackle these complex, information-
driven policy questions. 
                                                                                                                                  
 69. Id. at 48–49. 
 70. Id. at 48. 
 71. Id. at 49. 
 72. Id. at 48–49. See also Frank I. Michelman, Poverty in Liberalism: A 
Comment on the Constitutional Essentials, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1001, 1016–19 
(2012) [hereinafter Michelman, Poverty in Liberalism] (noting that the 
placement of socioeconomic justice within the second principle does not de-
grade its importance but rather leaves it to a more suitable process). 
 73. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 23. 
 74. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 48. 
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B. The Constraint of Public Reason 
1.  A Shift in Rawlsian Thought 
In his later writings, John Rawls moved away from the com-
prehensive doctrine he set out in A THEORY OF JUSTICE.75 A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE sought to improve on the work of social 
contractarians like Kant and Rousseau to create a superior 
theory to the “dominant tradition of utilitarianism.”76 To that 
end, it promulgated the “theory of justice as fairness as a com-
prehensive doctrine.”77 Recognizing the fact of reasonable plu-
ralism—that citizens in any democratic society hold a diverse 
range of comprehensive doctrines—Rawls’s later work regards 
a society adhering to a single comprehensive doctrine as impos-
sible to create.78 Rawls therefore introduces the idea of “over-
lapping consensus” to formulate a more realistic, well-ordered 
society.79 This concept reconciles the fact of reasonable plural-
ism with Rawls’s view that all citizens must agree on the same 
political conception of justice to have a well-ordered society. 
Since citizens will not be able to agree on a single comprehen-
sive view, citizens should instead aim for a reasonable overlap-
ping consensus of this political conception despite conflicting 
moral, religious, and philosophical views within a society.80 In 
other words, the political conception of justice as fairness can 
be a “shared point of view” even though citizens do not affirm it 
for the same reasons.81 
In this pluralistic society, there must be reasonable grounds 
for communication among citizens with different (and some-
times conflicting) reasons for endorsing justice as fairness as a 
political conception of justice. In particular, there must be 
agreement on the guidelines of public inquiry and on the crite-
ria as to what information and knowledge is relevant in dis-
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cussing questions of basic justice and constitutional essen-
tials.82 
Enter the constraint of public reason—it is the means 
through which societies faced with reasonable pluralism can 
conform to the liberal principle of legitimacy. Since each citizen 
has an equal share of political power, that power should be ex-
ercised in ways that all citizens can publicly endorse in light of 
their own reason.83 Public reason therefore requires that citi-
zens present publicly acceptable reasons to each other for their 
political views, at least with regard to basic justice and consti-
tutional essentials.84 Citizens must also be willing to “listen to 
others” and display “fair-mindedness in deciding when accom-
modations to their views should reasonably be made.”85 
Public reason extends to all public discourse pertaining to 
basic justice and constitutional essentials, but not to other po-
litical questions.86 It also does not constrain personal delibera-
tions about political questions or the discussion of such ques-
tions within associations such as churches and universities.87 
As for its subjects, public reason applies to the public acts, pro-
nouncements, and deliberations of elected officials, the decision 
making of judges, and to political discourse among ordinary 
citizens when, for instance, they exercise their right to vote or 
engage in public advocacy.88 
Rawls did not precisely specify the content of public reason. 
He stated that it includes “general beliefs and reasoning found 
in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science, 
when not controversial.”89 He added that while comprehensive 
religious and philosophical doctrines can be introduced and 
discussed so that citizens better understand each other’s views, 
these doctrines are not public reasons and therefore cannot 
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form the basis for public discourse on matters of basic justice 
and constitutional essentials.90 Citizens (including elected rep-
resentatives and judges) must instead advocate for the laws 
and public polices they favor using general knowledge and 
ways of reasoning that all other citizens can access using their 
common powers of reason.91 
2. Public Reason and the Supreme Court 
Among the various institutions in a well-ordered democratic 
society, Rawls singled out the Supreme Court to play a “special 
role” in the application of public reason.92 He noted that a con-
stitutional democracy is dualist in nature: it contains both or-
dinary (legislative) and higher (constitutional) law.93 Because 
the Supreme Court is the final arbiter on questions of constitu-
tional law, it plays an important role in preventing erosion in 
this higher law by “transient majorities or . . . by organized and 
well-situated narrow interests skilled at getting their way.”94 
The Court therefore acts as an anti-majoritarian institution 
toward ordinary law or legislation. Yet, as Rawls made clear, it 
is not anti-majoritarian with regard to the higher, constitu-
tional law. More specifically, when its decisions reasonably fit 
with the text of the Constitution, constitutional precedents and 
political understandings of the Constitution, the Court is not 
anti-majoritarian.95 Thus, Supreme Court justices must employ 
public reasons to explain and justify their decisions to a greater 
extent than society expects from legislative and executive offi-
cials.96 
Rawls referred to the Supreme Court as the “exemplar of 
public reason” because the Court may not employ any other 
sort of reason in discharging its constitutional duty.97 While 
ordinary citizens and elected representatives confront all sorts 
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of political questions that do not concern basic justice and con-
stitutional essentials—and therefore do not fall under the con-
straint of public reason—Supreme Court justices are tasked 
with trying to articulate the best interpretation of the Consti-
tution. They seek to do this through reasoned opinions that 
cannot invoke their own (or anyone else’s) moral or philosophi-
cal beliefs, but must be grounded in political values that reflect 
their best understanding of the public conception of justice.98 
They must justify their decisions with public reasons and fit 
them into “a coherent constitutional view over the whole range 
of their decisions.”99 As a result, the idea of public reason ap-
plies “more strictly” to judges, particularly to Supreme Court 
justices, than to other members of society.100 
Rawls was careful to clarify, however, that in marking out 
the Supreme Court for an exemplary role in this context, he did 
not intend to defend the practice of judicial review.101 He in-
stead noted, rather ambiguously, judicial review “can perhaps 
be defended given certain historical circumstances and condi-
tions of political culture.”102 Part IV, infra, applies this claim to 
the Indian context, and considers whether political and histori-
cal factors justify the Indian Supreme Court’s heavy-handed 
exercise of judicial review. 
C. Socioeconomic Rights as Constitutional Rights 
The final component of this Article’s theoretical framework is 
to connect Rawlsian political theory to legal constitutional the-
ory. Here, it draws on the scholarship of Professor Frank 
Michelman, who has contributed several academic papers on 
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the intersection of these two fields.103 The focus in much of this 
scholarship is constitutional legitimacy. In particular, Michel-
man examines the extent to which constitutional law and the 
practice of judicial review can be legitimate in light of substan-
tive disagreements among citizens in a democratic society on 
major questions of political justice.104 
In The Constitution, Social Rights and Liberal Political Justi-
fication, Michelman addresses the effects of constitutional soci-
oeconomic rights on a constitution’s legitimacy.105 As an initial 
matter, he notes that part of the debate over whether it is wise 
to confer constitutional status on socioeconomic guarantees 
turns on substantive disagreements.106 For instance, not every-
one believes that a moral and just society must include consti-
tutional rights to food, adequate housing, or other means of so-
cial support. Yet, even those who are morally convinced that 
socioeconomic guarantees should be given constitutional status 
must overcome certain non-substantive objections to make a 
persuasive case for such constitutionalization.107 
The most common non-substantive objection to granting soci-
oeconomic guarantees constitutional protection pertains to the 
judiciary’s role in enforcing socioeconomic rights. The concern 
is that courts will be “unable to make convincingly crisp as-
sessments of the government’s compliance or non-compliance 
with social rights guarantees, or to fashion apt and pointed re-
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medial orders . . . without getting themselves disastrously 
mixed up in matters beyond their province and their ken.”108 
While this is a valid concern, the terms of the debate would 
be incomplete if the concern is solely (or even primarily) with 
the judiciary’s proper role in a separation of powers framework 
and its institutional competence. As Michelman points out, the 
judiciary can play a “useful, if modest, role[] in the promotion of 
distributive aims of social guarantees.”109 Alternatively, if 
courts are barred from adjudicating questions of socioeconomic 
justice, it “would not be a good argument against constitution-
alization in the sight of anyone who believes that a morally le-
gitimate political regime must include a visible, effective com-
mitment” to certain positive entitlements provided by the 
state.110 
In Michelman’s view, even if we accept the above two points, 
the positive case for constitutional socioeconomic rights is not 
complete.111 He ventures beyond judiciary-related concerns and 
sets out two more non-substantive objections to the constitu-
tionalization of socioeconomic rights.112 First, he lays out a 
“democratic objection”—namely that the placement of socioeco-
nomic rights in a Constitution will unduly constrain democratic 
decision making, regardless of whether courts are involved in 
enforcing these rights.113 Second, there is a “contractarian ob-
jection” that opposes constitutionalization on the ground that 
socioeconomic rights would be so indeterminate that rational 
citizens, acting reasonably, could not agree to be governed by a 
constitution that included such rights.114 On this view, the in-
clusion of socioeconomic rights in a constitution defeats one of 
the fundamental purposes of a constitution—to provide liberal 
political legitimacy to coercive laws and acts of the state. 
Michelman suggests that both objections are manageable. He 
says: (1) that their force depends on how sweepingly (or specifi-
cally) socioeconomic rights are couched; (2) that the contractar-
ian objection is mitigated by the constraint of public reason; 
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and (3) that the democratic objection is only grave if we accept 
a narrow conception of democracy.115 
1. The Democratic Objection 
The democratic objection asserts that placing socioeconomic 
guarantees in a constitution would excessively restrict demo-
cratic policymaking on a range of issues. William Forbath pro-
vides a “dramatic” illustration of this objection in his proposal 
of constitutional rights to “social citizenship.”116 Going beyond 
what he refers to as “welfare rights” (rights to a minimum 
amount of money or of basic necessities for work), Forbath pro-
poses constitutional rights to social citizenship that provide as-
surances so one can make a decent living through forms of so-
cial participation that provide the opportunity for self-
improvement, material interdependence, and security for all.117 
Though Forbath does not define the exact contours of such 
rights, they seem to affect a number of policy areas including 
spending on public works, union and industrial policy, tax laws 
and policies, workplace health and safety, immigration laws, 
and trade policy.118 Thus, if socioeconomic rights are conceived 
as constitutional rights to social citizenship, there might not be 
a single issue on the political agenda left untouched.119 
Michelman contrasts these vast social citizenship rights to 
Section 26 of the South African Constitution, which requires 
the government to take reasonable measures toward the pro-
gressive realization of adequate housing for all citizens.120 In 
                                                                                                                                  
 115. See id. at 23–24, 37–38. 
 116. Id. at 31; W.E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Cri-
tique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1887–88 (2001) [herein-
after Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights]. See also W.E. Forbath, Not So 
Simple Justice: Frank Michelman on Social Rights, 1969-Present, 39 TULSA L. 
REV. 597 (2004). 
 117. See Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 116, at 1827 
(“Centered on decent work, livelihoods, and social provision, [the social citi-
zenship tradition] . . . read[s] the promise of the Antislavery and Reconstruc-
tion Amendments in ‘Free Labor’ terms, as a guarantee of opportunities for 
self-improvement and a measure of material independence and security for 
all.”); Michelman, supra note 2, at 31. 
 118. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 32; W.E. Forbath, Caste, Class and 
Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49 (1999). 
 119. Michelman, supra note 2, at 32–33. 
 120. See id. at 31–33; S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 26. 
2014] THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 21 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, the 
South African Constitutional Court held that government-
housing measures did not meet the reasonableness standard 
set forth under Section 26 and ordered the government to sub-
mit revised plans for judicial review.121 
Here, as in many other cases before the South African Con-
stitutional Court, the court required socioeconomic policies to 
meet a not-too-burdensome reasonableness standard and did 
not formulate its own solutions when the government failed to 
meet that standard.122 This approach does not unduly interfere 
with democratic policymaking. By contrast, Forbath’s social 
citizenship rights would seem to remove many issues from the 
policymaking agenda, or constrain the choices available to poli-
cymakers to a potentially intolerable extent in a representative 
democracy. Thus, the strength of the democratic objection 
turns, in part, on the way socioeconomic rights are couched in a 
constitution. 
Even if constitutional socioeconomic rights are couched 
broadly as in Forbath’s conception, they still might be demo-
cratically acceptable. Assuming that policymakers in the elect-
ed branches take the constitution seriously and constitutional 
rights figure prominently in their policymaking, it might still 
be useful to include broad socioeconomic rights in a constitu-
tion to “give a certain inflection to political public reason.”123 In 
this scenario—where the judiciary plays no role—elected offi-
cials would be forced to exercise judgment on how to make po-
litical choices that are conducive to social citizenship for all. 
This requires moving away from the traditional definition of 
democracy as “a series of free-for-all contests of normatively 
unregulated preferences” toward a fuller conception of democ-
racy as “the practice by which citizens communicatively form, 
test, exchange, revise and pool their constitutional-interpretive 
                                                                                                                                  
 121. See Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) 
SA 46 (CC) at ¶ 93 (S. Afr.). 
 122. See generally HEINZ KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: A 
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 143–46 (2010). 
 123. Michelman, supra note 2, at 39. See also RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 
supra note 7, at 212–20. 
22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:1 
judgments, only counting them as required to obtain . . . the 
institutional settlements a country needs.”124 
If democracy is defined in these broad and idealistic terms, 
and if socioeconomic rights are couched narrowly (as in South 
Africa), the democratic objection poses little threat to constitu-
tional legitimacy. The Indian Supreme Court, however, has in-
terpreted the Indian Constitution to include expansive socioec-
onomic rights that the judiciary can enforce in a manner that 
undermines democratic policymaking.125 This strong form of 
judicial review is perhaps only defensible in light of India’s his-
tory and political culture.126 
2. The Contractarian Objection 
The contractarian objection focuses on the difficulty of meas-
uring government compliance with socioeconomic rights. Social 
contractarians maintain that a citizen will only agree to abide 
by a constitution—which provides the government coercive 
power to compel her to act in prescribed ways and the ability to 
make policy choices with which she disagrees—if she sees other 
citizens and her government also complying with this constitu-
tion.127 This ability to observe others abiding by the constitu-
tion is essential. It allows each citizen to confirm that the con-
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stitution’s provisions, entailing commitments that make it uni-
versally acceptable, are in fact real.128 
However, it might not be possible to identify when others, in-
cluding the government, comply with constitutionally mandat-
ed socioeconomic rights. Imagine two societies that have enact-
ed constitutional rights to sufficient food. In one society, the 
government passes laws aimed at increasing agricultural pro-
duction, improving the food distribution system, and giving 
food stamps to everyone living below the poverty line. These 
provisions will take ten years to supply adequate food to all cit-
izens, but will provide a sustainable food supply thereafter. In 
the second society, the government only passes one law that 
mandates the immediate distribution of sufficient food to all 
citizens living below the poverty line. Yet, food supplies are 
limited, and in the long-term there will not be adequate food 
production to supply everyone in need. In this hypothetical 
scenario, one society has adopted laws that will gradually but 
sustainably provide food for all, while the other provides food 
immediately to every citizen in need at the cost of long-term 
food security. Does one society comply with the right to food 
while the other does not? If so, which one? Isn’t it plausible 
that both (or neither) have fulfilled this right? It seems that 
one cannot decisively say if such a right is or is not being satis-
fied.129 
According to the contractarian objection, this “raging inde-
terminacy” prevents rational citizens, acting reasonably, from 
determining when their government complies with or violates 
socioeconomic rights.130 Constitutional legitimacy is therefore 
threatened, as citizens will not consent to be governed by a 
constitution when they cannot observe their government abid-
ing by what should be universally accepted constitutional 
commitments.131 
Socioeconomic rights, as this argument goes, lack the “trans-
parency” of civil and political rights.132 They cannot be “more-
or-less detectably . . . realised (or not) at any given moment.”133 
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Traditionally, civil and political rights, including, inter alia, the 
right to the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, due pro-
cess, and equal protection were referred to as “negative 
rights.”134 This is because civil and political rights protect indi-
vidual liberty against state intrusion. Socioeconomic rights 
concern distributive justice. They require the government to 
provide positive entitlements to satisfy material needs or 
wants, or to provide access to the means of satisfaction.135 
The distinction between these two sets of rights has been crit-
icized in the academic literature. Critics argue that the distinc-
tion is artificial because these rights interact in important 
ways. In particular, they point out that those suffering from 
serious want or need cannot effectively exercise civil and politi-
cal rights.136 It is of little value to an individual dying of starva-
tion or thirst, for instance, to have a constitutional right to 
vote. 
Nevertheless, the contractarian objection relies on this dis-
tinction. It depends on the premise that it is significantly more 
difficult to gauge compliance with or violations of socioeconomic 
rights than of civil and political rights.137 This perceived inde-
terminacy of socioeconomic rights also factored into Rawls’s de-
cision to defer questions of socioeconomic justice to the legisla-
tive process after the constitutional essentials (including a 
scheme of basic liberties or negative rights) are decided.138 
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Still, constitutionalized socioeconomic rights are not fatal to 
contractarian legitimacy under Rawlsian theory.139 Under 
Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy, a constitution is only 
legitimate if all its citizens, who are rationally self-interested 
and reasonable, consent to be governed by its essentials.140 
Since socioeconomic rights are not part of the scheme of “con-
stitutionally essential” negative rights, reasonable minds can 
disagree as to their implementation, but must express their 
views pursuant to the constraint of public reason.141 Thus, citi-
zens and public institutions must be willing to explain and de-
fend their votes on matters of socioeconomic justice, in a man-
ner that reflects their honest best judgments on how to ensure 
socioeconomic justice for all.142 This “eases the strain on consti-
tutional contractarians” because policy choices in this realm 
would simply have to accord with some conception of a com-
plete, legitimate constitutional agreement that all rational citi-
zens, acting reasonably, would accept.143 However, if citizens 
cannot reasonably maintain confidence that their policymaking 
institutions are fulfilling the constraint of public reason, then 
the “extant system of positive legal ordering is unjust.”144 
Thus, the move to public reason allows a range of distributive 
policies and laws to be acceptable from a contractarian perspec-
tive. This is particularly true if socioeconomic guarantees are 
given the status of “directive principles” rather than “rights.”145 
These principles would guide public decision making on mat-
ters of socioeconomic justice, but leave it to elected representa-
tives to fashion the most effective laws and policies. 
The following section shows how the drafters of the Indian 
Constitution sought to avoid this contractarian difficulty by 
addressing socioeconomic justice through non-binding “Di-
                                                                                                                                  
 139. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 37–38. 
 140. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 41. 
 141. Id. at 38; see RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 214. 
 142. Michelman, supra note 2, at 38. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 37–39. Cf. Michelman, Poverty in Liberalism, supra note 72, 
at 1017–19 (noting that instead of making most socioeconomic rights consti-
tutionally essential, Rawls attached great importance to transparency in the 
adjudication of these rights as the means to effectively pursue justice). 
26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:1 
rective Principles of State Policy” that would “give a certain 
inflection to political public reason.”146 
II. THE FRAMING OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 
A. Directive Principles and Article 21 
India gained independence from British rule in 1947 and 
adopted a Constitution in 1950, which remains in force to-
day.147 The drafting of the Constitution began prior to inde-
pendence with the formation of a Constituent Assembly that 
began its work in December 1946.148 Their final product, a 
sprawling document of more than 300 articles and twelve 
schedules, balanced “negative” protections of individual liberty 
from government interference with “positive” guidelines for so-
cioeconomic justice.149 Thus, Part III of the Constitution, enti-
tled “Fundamental Rights,” sets forth a list of justiciable rights, 
including the rights to life, freedom of speech, and freedom of 
religion that was modeled largely on the American Bill of 
Rights.150 Part IV of the Constitution, by contrast, contains 
“Directive Principles of State Policy”—nonjusticiable economic 
and social provisions to be progressively realized by the Indian 
state. As Granville Austin put it, Part IV “set forth the human-
itarian precepts that were . . . the aims of the Indian Social 
Revolution.”151 
According to Austin, the Indian Constitution was, at its core, 
a “social document.”152 He noted that the Constituent Assembly 
sought to design a Constitution that would bring about social 
revolution in India.153 This ambitious goal had its roots in the 
struggle for independence, as the Indian National Congress 
was founded primarily to demand rights for Indian citizens 
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from the British Raj.154 It set forth these demands in various 
resolutions, including the Constitution of India Bill (1895), the 
Commonwealth of India Bill (1925), and the Karachi Resolu-
tion (1931). The Karachi Resolution was the first public de-
mand for positive rights toward greater socioeconomic jus-
tice.155 The Resolution proclaimed, “in order to end the exploi-
tation of the masses, political freedom must include the real 
economic freedom of the starving millions.”156 
Austin and others have argued that members of the Constit-
uent Assembly (or “framers”) placed such high value on socio-
economic justice that they did not differentiate between Parts 
III and IV of the Constitution in terms of importance.157 How-
ever, the members disagreed as to whether the directive prin-
ciples should be justiciable. Before the Constituent Assembly 
was formed, the most significant writing on this issue was the 
Sapru Report of 1945, which outlined a scheme of fundamental 
rights intended to alleviate the fears of minority groups.158 The 
Sapru Report’s most significant contribution was to distinguish 
between justiciable and nonjusticiable rights, even though it 
was in the context of minority protections with no mention of 
negative and positive rights.159 
B.N. Rau, one of the principal architects of Part IV, adopted 
the distinction between justiciable and nonjusticiable rights 
and applied it to the drafting of the Constitution. Rau was a 
member of the Drafting Committee, for which he assembled a 
set of precedents that the committee could draw on for ideas 
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and inspiration.160 Rau relied heavily on the Irish constitution-
al model, which included Directive Principles of State Policy. 
He believed India should emulate the Irish model by setting 
out positive rights “in the nature of moral precepts for the au-
thorities of the State.”161 
Other members of the Drafting Committee felt that this ap-
proach did not go far enough. They believed the Indian Consti-
tution should include justiciable socioeconomic rights. K.M. 
Munshi, for instance, put forth draft lists of the “Rights of 
Workers” and “Social Rights,” which included the right to a liv-
ing wage and protections for women and children.162 B.R. 
Ambedkar, who famously rose from disadvantaged begin-
nings—he belonged to a scheduled (untouchable) caste—to be-
come the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, favored an ex-
tensive set of rights for members of minority communities, par-
ticularly the scheduled castes.163 He also pushed for a social 
scheme to nationalize all major industries that would take ef-
fect ten years after the Constitution was adopted.164 Similarly, 
Drafting Committee member K.T. Shah believed that even if 
directive principles were initially nonbinding, they should be-
come justiciable after a specified time.165 He also believed that 
all natural resources and key industries should become proper-
ty of the state.166 
These views reflect the deep-seated socialist beliefs of many 
Constituent Assembly members, which largely derived from 
the negative association between British imperialism and capi-
talism.167 As ex-colonial subjects, the framers were wary of re-
placing British capitalists—who were widely seen as exploiting 
Indian resources for the benefit of the home country—with 
homegrown Indian capitalists.168 They also believed that In-
dia’s very survival rested on their ability to bring about a rapid 
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socioeconomic transformation among the poverty-stricken 
“masses.”169 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, 
stated that the first task of the Constituent Assembly was “to 
free India through a new constitution, to feed the starving peo-
ple, and to clothe the naked masses, and to give every Indian 
the fullest opportunity to develop himself.”170 If the Assembly 
failed to bring about this social revolution, Nehru warned “all 
our paper constitutions will become useless and purposeless . . . 
if India goes down, all will go down.”171 
Still, despite their strong socialist leanings, the Drafting 
Committee—and eventually the Constituent Assembly—
adopted the Irish model that separated justiciable fundamental 
rights from non-enforceable directive principles.172 There ap-
pear to be two separate motivations behind this decision. First, 
the framers wanted to leave some discretion to the legislature 
on matters of socioeconomic justice, rather than tie their hands 
with binding constitutional provisions. Ambedkar’s social 
scheme, other proposals for enforceable rights, and time-bound 
provisions toward greater socioeconomic justice were rejected 
on these grounds.173 Ambedkar eventually came around to sup-
port nonbinding directive principles, believing that future legis-
latures would be compelled to fulfill their mandate or “answer 
for them before the electorate at election time.”174 
A second motivation to separate justiciable fundamental 
rights from nonenforceable directive principles was Assembly 
members’ skepticism of the judiciary and desire to minimize its 
impact on social legislation.175 B.N. Rau visited the United 
States in 1947 where he met with U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Felix Frankfurter.176 Frankfurter, a noted proponent of judicial 
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restraint, generally opposed U.S. Supreme Court decisions that 
struck down legislative or executive acts.177 In his view, wide-
ranging judicial review was not only burdensome to the judici-
ary, but also undemocratic for allowing a few unelected judges 
to invalidate laws and orders issued by elected officials.178 
Frankfurter strongly influenced Rau, who convinced the Draft-
ing Committee to remove the words “due process” from Article 
21 of the Constitution.179 As a result, the final version of Article 
21 reads, “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to procedure established by law”.180 
Thus, under the original understanding of Article 21, the Indi-
an state may deprive individuals of life or liberty as long as it 
follows some legal process, the content or fairness of which lies 
outside the domain of judicial review. 
Additionally, the Constituent Assembly adopted the judicial 
conservatism of their former British rulers. According to Rajeev 
Dhavan, the British took pains “to ensure that the courts of the 
Raj were not empowered to question governmental action.”181 
“Judges were selected for their conservatism, loyalty and inde-
pendence,” creating a judiciary that was a “safe institution.”182 
The British therefore created a tradition of judicial passivity 
that was passed on to the Constituent Assembly members. For 
instance, Ambedkar expressed the framers’ general view that 
the judiciary should remain independent from political inter-
ference but should nonetheless limit its review of government 
policies. He stated before the Assembly, “the judiciary is en-
gaged in deciding issue(s) between citizens, and very rarely be-
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tween citizens and Government. Consequently, the chances of 
influencing the . . . judiciary by the government are very re-
mote.”183 
Thus, Ambedkar, Rau, and the other drafters were not pro-
ponents of a strong judiciary. They were wary of New Deal ju-
risprudence from the United States,184 and were steeped in the 
British tradition of judicial conservatism. This influenced the 
drafting of Article 21 and probably influenced the drafting of 
the directive principles as well. Though most (if not all) of the 
framers had strong socialist convictions, they agreed in the end 
to separate justiciable rights (Part III) from non-binding di-
rective principles (Part IV). The drafting of Parts III and IV 
therefore do not reflect the framers’ socialist views as much as 
their twin desires to defer to the legislature on matters of soci-
oeconomic justice and to limit the power and reach of the judi-
ciary. 
To clearly separate these two Parts of the Constitution, the 
framers placed unambiguous textual commands to indicate 
that fundamental rights in Part III are justiciable, but that di-
rective principles in Part IV are not. Article 32 of the Constitu-
tion guarantees the right of individual citizens “to move the 
Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforce-
ment” of fundamental rights.185 Article 37, though, states that 
directive principles “shall not be enforceable by any court, but 
the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental 
in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the 
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State to apply these principles in making laws.”186 This rule 
clearly prevents the judiciary from enforcing directive princi-
ples against the Indian State. 
B. Standing (Locus Standi) Requirements for Article 32 
Article 32 is the primary mechanism in the Indian Constitu-
tion to redress violations of fundamental rights. Ambedkar re-
ferred to it as the heart and soul of the Constitution, emphasiz-
ing its vital role in preventing government from encroaching 
upon individual rights.187 
Article 32 empowers the Indian Supreme Court to grant a 
range of remedies.188 It provides that the Court may issue “di-
rections or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of ha-
beas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certio-
rari” as it deems appropriate in a given case.189 Article 32 also 
states that citizens may move the Supreme Court for the en-
forcement of a right through “appropriate proceedings.”190 This 
grants the Court some discretion to determine the procedure 
through which citizens may bring petitions alleging fundamen-
tal rights violations.191 
In the Court’s early jurisprudence, the phrase “appropriate 
proceedings” was construed narrowly to permit only those indi-
viduals whose rights had been directly infringed to bring 
suit.192 Much like the framers who were strongly influenced by 
British notions of judicial conservatism, the Supreme Court 
borrowed from the Anglo-American legal tradition to adopt 
strict standing (or locus standi) requirements under Article 
32.193 
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In Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India (1951), the Court held that 
a shareholder of a company did not have standing under Article 
32 to petition the Court to enforce a corporation’s right to hold 
and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitu-
tion.194 The Court noted that a corporation and its shareholders 
are separate entities, and therefore only the corporation could 
properly bring this claim.195 
Similarly, in G.C. College Silchar v. Gauhati University 
(1973), petitioners challenged a resolution by a Gauhati Uni-
versity’s Academic Council to retain English and introduce the 
native language (Assamese) as the languages of instruction.196 
The petitioners claimed that this resolution violated their 
rights under Articles 29 and 30 (allowing minorities to enroll in 
any educational institution of their choice and preventing the 
state from discriminating against minorities in academic ad-
missions, respectively) of the Constitution.197 Prior to this reso-
lution, the university had used Bengali alongside English to 
help students understand the content of English-language lec-
tures.198 Despite the fact that one petitioner was a Bengali-
speaking student, the Court found that “the impugned resolu-
tion does not presently affect the petitioners.”199 Thus, it held 
that the petitioners lacked standing to file this petition.200 
These cases evince a broader pattern in the Court’s early ju-
risprudence to deny standing under Article 32 unless petition-
ers could demonstrate that an impugned law had directly 
harmed them.201 However, as the following section shows, the 
Court would later relax its standing requirements to allow any 
person to move for the enforcement of the fundamental rights 
of other individuals and groups too disadvantaged to file peti-
tions themselves.202 
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III. EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS, 
PROCEDURAL INNOVATIONS AND THE JUDICIARY’S EXPANDING 
ROLE 
This Section will show how the Indian Supreme Court’s ju-
risprudence with respect to both Article 21 and Article 32 has 
transformed dramatically since the early years of the Indian 
republic. At the time of their adoption, Articles 21 and 32 of the 
Indian Constitution were construed narrowly. Drawing from 
Justice Frankfurter and the British views of judicial restraint, 
Article 21 was carefully drafted to exclude any mention of “due 
process” in favor of the phrase “procedure established by 
law.”203 This sought to avoid the “substantive due process” doc-
trine that emerged in the United States, and permitted the 
government to deprive citizens of life or liberty as long as it 
acted pursuant to a duly enacted law. Similarly, relying on 
American and British jurisprudence, the Supreme Court’s early 
cases imposed strict standing requirements on petitioners un-
der Article 32.204 Thus, only petitioners directly harmed by a 
disputed law could petition the Court to redress violations of 
the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitu-
tion. 
Over time, Article 21 has not only evolved toward American-
style due process,205 but has also been read to encompass the 
right to “live with dignity,”206 which includes socioeconomic 
rights. Meanwhile, Article 32 standing requirements have been 
relaxed through the development of public interest litigation 
(“PIL”).207 These changes allow any citizen to petition the Court 
to redress fundamental rights violations suffered by disadvan-
taged individuals or groups. The advent of PIL has also 
brought about a series of procedural innovations that give the 
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courts greater authority in monitoring and enforcing rights-
protective schemes.208 
These substantive and procedural developments in the law 
have fundamentally altered the judiciary’s role within the In-
dian constitutional framework. In particular, there has been an 
increase in (1) the range of rights that courts can enforce; (2) 
the number of people that are permitted to file (and are affect-
ed by) petitions alleging fundamental rights violations; and (3) 
the extent to which the courts can supervise the implementa-
tion of their orders. Together, these developments vest a great 
deal of additional authority in the judiciary at the expense of 
democratic decision making in the elected branches of govern-
ment. 
A. The Evolution of Article 21 
1. Early Cases 
In its early years, the Indian Supreme Court remained faith-
ful to the original understanding of Article 21. In the first ma-
jor case to examine Article 21, Gopalan v. State of Madras 
(1950), the Supreme Court declined to adopt an expansive in-
terpretation.209 In Gopalan, the primary issue was whether cer-
tain provisions of the Preventative Detention Act of 1950 vio-
lated Articles 13, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution.210 The 
petitioner, who was detained pursuant to this Act, drew on the 
U.S. Constitution to argue that the Court should interpret Ar-
ticle 21 in line with American jurisprudence on the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.211 Writing for the Court, Chief Jus-
tice Kania rejected this argument, noting, inter alia, that the 
word “liberty” in Article 21 means merely “personal liberty,” 
whereas in the American context, liberty has a more expansive 
meaning.212 The Chief Justice also looked to the Constituent 
Assembly debates to establish that the words “due process” 
were intentionally omitted in favor of the more government-
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friendly “procedure established by law.”213 Thus, the Court held 
that Article 21 permitted the state to deprive an individual of 
liberty as long as it did so pursuant to a “procedure prescribed 
by the law of the state.”214 
The Gopalan Court’s interpretation of Article 21, which re-
jected broad interpretations of “liberty” and analogies to Amer-
ican due process, was later challenged and rejected. The move 
away from Gopalan began in the landmark case Keshavananda 
Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala (1973).215 While this 
case did not address the meaning of Article 21, it had lasting 
implications on constitutional interpretation generally.216 
Keshavananda held that amendments to the Constitution are 
invalid if they violate the “basic structure” of the Constitu-
tion.217 Article 368 of the Indian Constitution permits amend-
ments if they are adopted by a two-thirds majority in both 
houses of Parliament.218 However, according to Justice Khanna 
in Keshavananda, the words “this Constitution” and “the Con-
stitution shall stand amended” that appear in Article 368 are 
evidence of a constitutional identity that the legislature did not 
have the authority to alter.219 For instance, an amendment 
abolishing the Supreme Court would be invalid, as it would 
fundamentally alter the separation of powers framework of the 
Constitution. 
For the purposes of this Article, Keshavananda is significant 
for three reasons. First, it replaced the framer’s model of par-
liamentary supremacy with a form of judicial supremacy, sig-
naling a change in the allocation of power among branches of 
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government.220 Second, it paved the way for future cases that 
describe the content of the Constitution’s “basic structure,” in 
which the Supreme Court equates fundamental rights with di-
rective principles in terms of their importance. For instance, in 
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980), Justice Chandra-
chud stated that Parts III and IV of the Constitution act “like a 
twin formula for achieving a social revolution which is the ideal 
. . . the visionary founders of the Constitution set before them-
selves.”221 This laid the foundation for the Supreme Court to 
rule that Article 21 includes socioeconomic rights within its 
ambit. Finally, Keshavananda provided the impetus for many 
of the laws and constitutional amendments passed during the 
era of Emergency Rule.222 
2. Emergency Rule and Its Aftermath 
Emergency Rule (1975–77) was declared by Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi to allow her to remain in power and rule by ex-
ecutive decree following widespread calls for her resignation. In 
1975, Mrs. Gandhi was convicted by the Allahabad High Court 
for election fraud in the 1971 general elections.223 In the face of 
strong pressure to resign, Mrs. Gandhi declared a state of 
emergency in June 1975. Her regime then suspended habeas 
corpus, severely restricted civil liberties and the freedom of the 
press, and sought to weaken the judiciary.224 
In fact, Mrs. Gandhi’s administration had openly attacked 
the judiciary prior to declaring Emergency Rule.225 In reaction 
to the Keshavananda decision in 1973, Mrs. Gandhi went 
against tradition and installed her own pro-government nomi-
nee—who had dissented in Keshavananda—as Chief Justice of 
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the Supreme Court, ahead of three more senior justices.226 This 
sort of political manipulation of the judiciary increased during 
Emergency Rule, as Mrs. Gandhi’s regime transferred judges 
from one High Court to another as punishment for ruling 
against the central government.227 
The Emergency Rule era also witnessed the passage of four 
constitutional amendments that were designed to limit the ju-
diciary’s power.228 The most controversial was the Forty-second 
Amendment, which prohibited judicial review of the disputed 
1971 election, overturned Keshavananda by barring the Su-
preme Court from reviewing constitutional amendments, and 
required a two-third majority of Court benches to hold statutes 
unconstitutional.229 Even more radically, the Forty-second 
Amendment gave the nonjusticiable directive principles in Part 
IV of the Constitution precedence over the fundamental rights 
in Part III.230 Ostensibly, this amendment was supposed to 
vindicate the framers’ vision for social revolution, but in reality 
it permitted the government to detain thousands of political 
opponents without charge and impose an authoritarian social-
ist vision on the country that the framers, with their reverence 
for democracy, would never have supported.231 
Fortunately, Emergency Rule ended less than two years later 
in March 1977. Mrs. Gandhi finally called for elections and her 
Indian National Congress Party was defeated by the opposition 
Janata Party.232 The Janata Party moved quickly to rescind the 
controversial constitutional amendments passed by Mrs. Gan-
dhi’s regime, and also repealed the Emergency Rule era laws 
that suppressed free speech and suspended habeas corpus.233 
Emergency Rule still left a lasting impression on the status of 
directive principles under the Indian Constitution. After the 
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repeal of the Forty-second Amendment—which had, inter alia, 
overruled Keshavananda and made directive principles superi-
or to fundamental rights—the Supreme Court relied on Kesha-
vananda to hold that directive principles and fundamental 
rights are equivalent parts of the “basic structure” of the Con-
stitution.234 In making this bold claim, the Court, much like 
Mrs. Gandhi’s regime, cited the need for social revolution. It 
drew inspiration from the framers, quoting Nehru for the prop-
osition that while fundamental rights are “static,” directive 
principles “represent a dynamic move towards a certain objec-
tive.”235 The Court did not put forth any legal reasons to ex-
plain why directive principles should be placed on the same 
footing as fundamental rights.236 Nevertheless, it did not mere-
ly declare that Parts III and IV of the Constitution were equiv-
alent, but actually ruled in a series of cases that the directive 
principles were justiciable under the right to life in Article 21. 
3. Maneka Gandhi and the Right to “Live with Dignity” 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Maneka Gandhi 
v. Union of India (1978) dramatically expanded the meaning of 
Article 21.237 Maneka Gandhi, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s 
daughter-in-law, alleged that the ruling Janata government 
had illegally seized her passport pursuant to the Passport Act 
of 1967.238 She argued that the Act contained no procedural 
guidelines for how to seize a citizen’s passport, and even if such 
a procedure existed, “it was arbitrary and unreasonable” and 
therefore violated, inter alia, Article 21 of the Constitution.239 
Writing for the Court, Justice Bhagwati construed the phrase 
“personal liberty” in Article 21 broadly to bring within its am-
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bit the right to travel abroad.240 He said “[t]he expression ‘per-
sonal liberty’ in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it co-
vers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal lib-
erty of man.”241 These rights include the right to equality under 
Article 14 and the right to freedom (including freedom of 
speech and to practice any profession) under Article 19. Justice 
Bhagwati further observed that the relevant statute did not 
provide a reasonable opportunity for the petitioner “to be heard 
in advance before impounding a passport.”242 He therefore ar-
gued that principles of “natural justice” and fairness had to be 
read into Article 21 so as “to invest law with fairness.”243 
The Court held that the Act arbitrarily deprived petitioner of 
personal liberty under Article 21.244 Through its decision, the 
Court implicitly overruled Gopalan by adopting a due process 
standard drawn from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the U.S. Constitution.245 Despite the framers’ purposeful omis-
sion of the words “due process,” the Court here expanded the 
meaning Article 21—and thereby expanded its own authority—
to require the government to show not only that a deprivation 
of life or liberty is conducted pursuant to a procedure estab-
lished by law, but also that this procedure is reasonable and 
not “arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive.”246 
The Maneka Gandhi judgment also set the stage for a further 
expansion of Article 21 that would embrace socioeconomic prin-
ciples as justiciable rights. Justice Bhagwati hinted at this de-
velopment in his majority opinion: 
Articles dealing with different fundamental rights contained 
in Part III of the Constitution do not represent entirely sepa-
rate streams of rights which do not mingle at many points. 
They are all parts of an integrated scheme in the Constitu-
tion. Their waters must mix to constitute that grand flow of 
unimpeded and impartial justice (social, economic and politi-
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cal), freedom (not only of thought, expression, belief, faith and 
worship, but also of association, movement, vocation or occu-
pation as well as of acquisition and possession of reasonable 
property), or equality (of status and of opportunity, which im-
ply absence of unreasonable or unfair discrimination between 
individuals, groups and classes), and of fraternity (assuring 
dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation).247 
Such broad rights-protective language signaled the Court’s 
expanding approach to fundamental rights. This excerpt makes 
a powerful rhetorical case for the interconnectedness of various 
rights, which the Court would go on to implement through the 
right to life in Article 21. 
Socioeconomic rights were included within the ambit of Arti-
cle 21 in Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi 
(1981). In this case, the Supreme Court had to determine 
whether a detainee held in preventative detention had the 
right to meet with his lawyer and family.248 While the case only 
raised this narrow issue, the Court, led by Justice Bhagwati, 
saw an opportunity to further expand the meaning of Article 
21. It held that the right to life includes a broader right to “live 
with human dignity.”249 This included “the bare [necessities] of 
life such as nutrition, clothing, and shelter.”250 In adopting this 
expansive interpretation, Justice Bhagwati made clear his be-
lief in a flexible, adaptive reading of the Constitution. In his 
view, “[A] constitutional provision must be construed, not in a 
narrow and constricted sense, but in a wide and liberal manner 
so as to anticipate and take account of changing conditions and 
purposes.”251 
The Supreme Court would follow this interpretative approach 
in later cases to hold that the right to life includes, inter alia, 
the rights to education,252 food,253 shelter,254 health and medical 
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care,255 and a livelihood.256 Thus, a range of justiciable socioec-
onomic rights has been realized since the Francis Coralie deci-
sion. To accomplish this feat, the Supreme Court substantively 
relied on an expansive reading of Article 21 where, despite the 
clear language in Article 37 stating that directive principles are 
not judicially enforceable,257 the right to life was held to en-
compass a right to live with dignity and therefore many of the 
directive principles. 
This substantive change in the law expanded the Court’s au-
thority to strike down legislation as incompatible with funda-
mental rights. Procedural changes—particularly with regard to 
standing requirements—also contributed to broadening judicial 
authority. These procedural modifications permit a greater 
number of citizens to bring claims of fundamental rights viola-
tions and empower the Court to actively monitor the imple-
mentation of its remedial schemes. 
B. The Development of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) 
PIL arose in response to a fundamental change in the Indian 
judiciary during the 1980s and 1990s in which the courts took 
an active role in promoting socioeconomic justice.258 The Su-
preme Court facilitated this process by instituting procedural 
changes, which allowed (and encouraged) public interest organ-
izations to file petitions on behalf of disadvantaged groups to 
hold the government accountable for large-scale violations of 
fundamental rights. 
PIL was a fundamentally new sort of litigation. It moved 
away from the traditional model of winner-take-all contests be-
tween two parties (or interests), where the judge acted as a 
passive referee, and courts focused on providing compensation 
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for past wrongs.259 Under the PIL paradigm, lawsuits involve a 
number of affected individuals or groups, judges assume an ac-
tive role in shaping litigation, and courts order various forms of 
relief in addition to compensation, including prospective relief 
that is monitored and reevaluated from time to time after liti-
gation ends.260 
The Indian Supreme Court developed PIL in the post-
Emergency Rule era through a series of procedural innova-
tions. The adoption of more liberal standing rules was one of 
the most significant innovations. Recall that the Court’s early 
cases imposed strict standing requirements that permitted only 
individuals directly affected by an impugned law to file peti-
tions under Article 32 of the Constitution.261 However, Article 
32 does not require this restrictive approach, as it sets forth the 
right of individual citizens to petition the Supreme Court via 
“appropriate proceedings” to enforce fundamental rights.262 
The Court’s interpretation of “appropriate proceedings” would 
shift over time toward the provision of greater social justice. 
The transformation began in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar 
Union v. Union of India (1981).263 In this case, the Chief Jus-
tice’s majority opinion hewed to the traditional view that 
standing under Article 32 should remain primarily with those 
individuals whose rights had been directly affected.264 Howev-
er, Justice Iyer, joined by Justice Bhagwati, wrote a concurring 
opinion that adopted a much broader approach. In their view, 
“locus standi must be liberalized to meet the challenges” facing 
a developing country like India.265 
This approach later prevailed in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India 
(1982).266 The petitioners in this case brought a number of 
claims alleging government interference with the judiciary. For 
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instance, they challenged a policy that gave judges only short-
term appointments, which they claimed had perverse effects on 
judicial independence.267 The Indian Government objected to 
this writ petition on the grounds that the petitioners were not 
the judges themselves.268 As a result, the government argued 
they had not been directly injured by this policy and lacked 
standing to file a petition under Article 32.269 The Court reject-
ed this argument in a majority opinion written by Justice 
Bhagwati.270 According to Justice Bhagwati, traditional stand-
ing rules were no longer appropriate because they developed 
“when private law dominated the legal scene and public law 
had not yet been born.”271 “Public law” here refers to landmark 
cases like Maneka Gandhi and Francis Coralie—Justice 
Bhagwati wrote the majority opinion in both cases—that trans-
formed the meaning of Article 21 to take into account the social 
and economic conditions of the public at large.272 Thus, to adapt 
to this new era of public law, the Court rejected the traditional 
view of standing and recognized the right of any member of the 
public to petition for redress of a wrong to a “person or to a de-
terminate class of persons . . . (who) by reason of poverty, help-
lessness or disability or socially disadvantaged position” cannot 
approach the Court themselves.273 S.P. Gupta empowered citi-
zens to file claims of fundamental rights violations on behalf of 
others less fortunate, a monumental change from the original 
rule requiring direct injury to petition the Court under Article 
32. 
According to Craig and Deshpande, in their seminal article 
on the rise of PIL, two major themes emerge from the Court’s 
reasoning for this radical shift in standing rules.274 First, the 
Court sought to exercise a greater degree of judicial review over 
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the actions of elected authorities. By adopting looser standing 
rules, the Court enabled the public to hold authorities account-
able to the judiciary and not simply to the “sweet will” of the 
authorities themselves.275 
A second and more innovative theme in the Court’s reasoning 
is that standing rules had to be changed “because the very pur-
pose of the law itself was undergoing a transformation. It was 
being used to foster social justice by creating new categories of 
rights.”276 This is closely linked to the simultaneous transfor-
mation in the Court’s interpretation of Article 21. Justice 
Bhagwati explicitly made this connection in his S.P. Gupta 
opinion. He noted that fundamental rights were “practically 
meaningless . . . unless accompanied by social rights necessary 
to make them effective and really accessible to all.”277 By “so-
cial rights,” Justice Bhagwati meant the directive principles in 
Part IV of the Indian Constitution, which he believed were in-
extricably linked to the fundamental rights in Part III.278 This 
is evident in the following passage: 
More and more frequently the conferment of . . . socio-
economic rights and imposition of public duties on the State 
and other authorities for taking positive action generates sit-
uations in which single human action can be beneficial or 
prejudicial to a large number of people, thus making entirely 
inadequate the traditional scheme of litigation as merely a 
two-party affair. For example, the discharge of effluent in a 
lake or river may harm all who want to enjoy its clean water; 
emission of noxious gas may cause injury to large numbers of 
people who inhale it along with the air, defective or unhealthy 
packaging may cause damage to all consumers of goods and so 
also illegal raising of railway or bus fares may affect the en-
tire public which wants to use the railway or bus as a means 
of transport.279 
Thus, for Justice Bhagwati, the traditional model of litigation 
was inadequate to protect the public interest from individual 
acts that harmed large swathes of the population. He therefore 
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gave an instrumental justification for liberalizing standing 
rules—they permitted the Court to give broader (and, in 
Bhagwati’s view, proper) meaning to Part III of the Constitu-
tion, by supplementing fundamental rights with directive prin-
ciples. 
Justice Bhagwati’s approach was enforced in Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha v. Union of India (1984).280 Here, a public interest or-
ganization petitioned to eradicate bonded labor.281 Though Ar-
ticle 23 of the Indian Constitution prohibits forced labor, the 
government argued that bonded labor did not violate any fun-
damental rights.282 Once again writing for the majority, Justice 
Bhagwati dismissed this argument, relying primarily on the 
right to life in Article 21.283 He reaffirmed that Article 21 pro-
tected the right to live with dignity, which included the right to 
live free from exploitation.284 To support this broad interpreta-
tion, Justice Bhagwati drew on various directive principles (Ar-
ticles 39, 41, and 42) that he said provided the “life breath” to 
Article 21.285 
Additionally, the Morcha case further entrenched the liberal 
standing requirements adopted in the S.P. Gupta case—it al-
lowed a nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) not directly 
affected by bonded labor to bring a claim under Article 32.286 
Justice Bhagwati even went so far as to suggest that PIL was 
nonadversarial. In fact, he encouraged the government to “wel-
come public interest litigation because it would [allow the gov-
ernment] . . . to examine whether the poor and down-trodden 
are getting their social and economic entitlements.”287 Justice 
Bhagwati would later describe PIL as a sort of “collaborative” 
litigation, where the petitioner, the government, and the Court 
work together rather than as adversaries to determine the best 
solutions to major social problems.288 
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C. The Indian Judiciary Today: Judges as Policymakers 
In the spirit of “collaborative” litigation, the Supreme Court 
in Morcha and later cases devised further procedural innova-
tions to give the judiciary a more substantial role in monitoring 
and enforcing the implementation of judicial orders.289 The Su-
preme Court appoints special commissions to conduct fact-
finding, propose remedies, and monitor compliance with its or-
ders.290 For instance, the Morcha Court appointed a special 
commission to investigate facts on its behalf.291 The Commis-
sion was ordered to prepare a report of its findings that “would 
furnish prima facie evidence of the facts and data . . . It would 
be entirely for the Court to determine what weight to attach to 
the facts and data.”292 
Other procedural innovations of the Supreme Court include: 
“epistolary jurisdiction”293 where courts treat a letter from a 
state detainee or prisoner as a writ petition under Article 32; 
and “continuing mandamus,” which, in cases like Morcha, al-
lows the Court to enforce its orders on a continuous basis even 
after litigation ends.294 Generally, the mechanism for enforce-
ment is a series of interim orders, which allows the Court not 
only to keep track of whether government schemes meet judi-
cial guidelines, but also to instruct the government on how to 
execute those schemes.295 
An example of how closely the Court supervises the imple-
mentation of its orders is the ongoing “Right to Food” litigation. 
In April 2001, the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (“PUCL”) 
filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution 
alleging that the Government of India, the Food Corporation of 
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India (“FCI”), and six state governments had violated the right 
to life of millions of Indian citizens under Article 21.296 When 
the petition was filed, India was experiencing a severe drought 
leading to high rates of poverty and malnutrition.297 The peti-
tioners argued that these government officials and the FCI had 
failed to provide adequate food supplies and employment to the 
affected population, which they were required to under the 
Famine Code of 1962.298 According to petitioners, since ade-
quate food is a necessary condition to sustain life, these state 
actors had an affirmative duty to provide and distribute food to 
citizens affected by the drought.299 This argument drew from 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 21 in Francis 
Coralie, where it held that the right to life encompassed a right 
to “live with dignity.”300 
On November 28, 2001, the Supreme Court issued an interim 
order recognizing certain food schemes as legal entitlements 
under Article 21.301 It also gave the central and state govern-
ments specific orders on how to implement those schemes. For 
instance, the Court instructed state governments “to complete 
the identification of BPL [below poverty line] families, issuing 
of cards and commencement of distribution of 25 kgs. grain per 
family per month latest by 1st January, 2002.”302 Additionally, 
it directed the central and state governments to provide “every 
child in every Government and Government assisted Primary 
Schools with a prepared mid day meal with a minimum content 
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of 300 calories and 8–12 grams of protein each day of school for 
a minimum of 200 days.”303 
In an interim order issued on May 2, 2003, the Court went 
even further to engage in “something strikingly close to law-
making.”304 To facilitate the proper distribution of grain sup-
plies, the Court issued directions to the government on how to 
regulate the issuance of licenses to distributors. These direc-
tions are formulated much like a statute would be. They re-
quire 
(1) Licensees, who (a) do not keep their shops open through-
out the month during the stipulated period, (b) fail to provide 
grain to BPL families strictly at BPL rates and no higher, (c) 
keep the cards of BPL households with them, (d) make false 
entries in the BPL cards, (e) engage in black-marketing or si-
phoning away of grains to the open market and hand over 
such ration shops to such other person/organizations, shall 
make themselves liable for cancellation of their licenses. The 
concerned authorities/functionaries would not show any laxity 
on the subject.305 
Today, more than a decade after it began, the “Right to Food” 
litigation continues with the Court issuing regular interim or-
ders directing the government how to implement its schemes 
and instituting timelines for the completion of those 
schemes.306 Over time, the litigation has grown to include all 
Indian state governments as respondents.307 Its scope has also 
expanded to cover a range of issues not directly related to the 
right to food, including urban poverty, the right to work, and 
even general issues of transparency and accountability in gov-
ernment implementation.308 
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IV. JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING AND THE DEMOCRATIC OBJECTION 
The judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, has transformed it-
self into a significant policymaking institution since the Consti-
tution’s adoption in 1950. The effect of this transformation is 
clear: the separation of powers framework set forth in the Con-
stitution has been weakened. The Court has sought to replace 
the division of powers among three branches of government 
“with a ‘unitarian’ claim of formal judicial supremacy.”309 
This supremacy emerged out of both substantive and proce-
dural developments in the Indian Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence. The directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution 
were drafted as nonjusticiable guidelines, but have become jus-
ticiable rights under the right to “live with dignity” in Article 
21.310 This has enabled the Supreme Court to adjudicate cases 
pertaining to socioeconomic rights. The concurrent develop-
ment of PIL led to relaxed standing rules, the appointment of 
special commissions, and other procedural innovations that al-
low the Court to take on a greater range of cases and to craft 
policy schemes that affect large numbers. Thus, PIL-related 
procedural changes, combined with an expansive substantive 
interpretation of the right to life, have fundamentally trans-
formed the judiciary’s role under the Indian Constitution. 
The “Right to Food” litigation exemplifies this transformation 
and shows how the Supreme Court has become a major player 
in formulating national socioeconomic policy. As of 2005, the 
Court in that case had issued forty-four interim orders and ap-
pointed two Commissioners charged with “monitoring and re-
porting to this Court of the implementation by the respondents 
of the various welfare measures and schemes.”311 This sort of 
judicial policymaking calls forth a serious democratic objection. 
The Court today constrains democratic decision making on a 
wide range—and potentially indefinite—set of policy issues, 
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leading many commentators to declare it the “most powerful 
court in the world.”312 
The Court’s role in Indian political life is difficult to square 
with a Rawlsian liberal conception of democracy. It is im-
portant to note this conception does not necessarily envision a 
strict separation of powers. In fact, Michelman does not rely on 
(nor even accept) the standard separation of powers trope, in 
which legislatures make policy choices without regard to law 
and courts appear later to review the legality of legislative ac-
tion.313 In fact, he argues that the democratic objection, which 
grows out of this view, “trades on a particular, contestable and 
indeed poor, conception of democracy.”314 Thus, society need not 
accept this narrow conception of separation of powers or the 
idea that norms should not be considered part of constitutional 
law simply because they are not enforced by courts.315 In fact, 
Michelman puts forth a different conception—one in which 
constitutional law figures prominently in the “conduct of public 
affairs,” constraining the acts of the executive and legisla-
ture.316 
This view relies on a framing of socioeconomic guarantees as 
directive principles guiding legislative action toward certain 
societal goals, and not as judicially enforceable rights. Even if 
courts are kept away from adjudicating socioeconomic rights, 
there is still value in placing these rights within a Constitu-
tion. The value lies in a subtle but important effect that consti-
tutional status confers—it would create a “certain pressure on 
the frame of mind” of citizens and their representatives to con-
sider principles of socioeconomic justice in their deliberations 
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and public policy decisions.317 These principles would not overly 
constrain democratic policymaking but give a “certain inflec-
tion to political public reason.”318 
This is exactly what the framers of the Indian Constitution 
had in mind when they separated fundamental rights from di-
rective principles and explicitly made the latter nonjusticia-
ble.319 However, the Indian judiciary, led by the Supreme 
Court, fundamentally altered the original Constitutional 
framework. The “Right to Food” litigation illustrates at least 
three ways in which the Supreme Court increased its own pow-
er and decision-making influence. 
First, as a result of its expansive reading of Article 21, the 
Court can enforce a greater number of rights than it could in 
the early years of the republic. When the Court first declared a 
right to “live with dignity,” it stated that it included “the bare 
necessities of life such as . . . nutrition, clothing, and shelter” 
over the head.320 However, the Court placed no limiting princi-
ple on this right,321 and this interpretation grows ever more ex-
pansive over time. The “Right to Food” litigation is emblematic 
of that growth—it began as a case about the supply and distri-
bution of food to famine-affected populations, but now encom-
passes issues of homelessness, maternity, and child develop-
ment.322 
In another recent case, the Supreme Court declared that even 
the “right to sleep” falls within the ambit of Article 21. Accord-
ing to the Court, “[s]leep is essential . . . to maintain the deli-
cate balance of health necessary for its very existence and sur-
vival.”323 Adequate sleep is therefore an important aspect of 
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human dignity “without which the existence of life itself would 
be in peril.”324 
Cases like this suggest that the right to “live with dignity” 
has potentially infinite scope. It calls to mind W.E. Forbath’s 
right to “social citizenship” that would provide assurances to all 
citizens that they can make a decent living through forms of 
social participation that provide the opportunity for self-
improvement, material interdependence, and security for all.325 
As Michelman noted, such a broadly conceived right would 
leave “no leading [political] issue . . . untouched.”326 This is the 
core of the democratic objection—when constitutional rights 
are couched in some of the widest imaginable terms, as they 
are by the Indian Supreme Court, the Constitution unduly re-
stricts democratic decision making on a range of issues.327 
By contrast, the South African Constitution couches its socio-
economic rights in much narrower terms. It includes judicially 
enforceable rights to a clean environment, housing, food, water, 
social security, and education.328 Faced with this finite, enu-
merated list of socioeconomic rights, the South African Consti-
tutional Court is much more constrained than its Indian coun-
terpart. For instance, it could not recognize a “right to sleep.” 
Moreover, with regard to the rights to housing, food, water, and 
social security, the South African Court requires only that the 
government take reasonable measures toward the progressive 
realization of these rights for all citizens.329 The Indian Su-
preme Court, however, is not so constrained—it has not set 
forth a clear standard of review for socioeconomic policies, giv-
ing it a greater license to intervene as it sees fit. 
A second way in which the Indian Supreme Court has in-
creased its influence on socioeconomic policy is through new, 
accommodating procedural requirements under Article 32, in-
cluding “epistolary jurisdiction” and relaxed standing rules. 
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This has transformed the Court into a forum where social 
movements, led by NGOs, can voice their grievances on behalf 
of large segments of the population, and in the process, obtain 
relief against the government. As Upendra Baxi put it, “People 
now know that the Court has constitutional power of interven-
tion, which can be invoked to ameliorate their miseries.”330 
For example, take the “Right to Food” litigation; PUCL, an 
NGO, filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution on 
behalf of thousands affected by famine, even though the NGO 
was not itself directly affected.331 Over time, the case expanded 
to include all Indian states as respondents,332 meaning that the 
Supreme Court’s interim orders could potentially impact all 
Indian citizens. 
Finally, a third and related means toward greater policymak-
ing authority for the Indian Supreme Court is a series of proce-
dural innovations; this includes the continuing mandamus and 
the appointment of special commissions that enable it to moni-
tor compliance with its orders. The “Right to Food” litigation 
has continued for more than eleven years, with the Court hav-
ing issued forty-four interim orders by 2005 and several more 
since then.333 More strikingly, the Court instructed both central 
and state governments on how to allocate resources under vari-
ous socioeconomic policy schemes and instituted timelines for 
their completion.334 The Court also appointed special commis-
sioners to monitor and report whether government actors are 
complying with the Court’s orders.335 
Together, these developments illustrate the judiciary’s rise as 
a policymaking institution and call forth a serious democratic 
objection. The fact that socioeconomic rights are couched in 
very broad terms under Article 21 is problematic in the Indian 
context, but need not be per se. For instance, say the Indian 
                                                                                                                                  
 330. Baxi, supra note 6, at 108. 
 331. See PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (In-
dia). 
 332. See A TOOL FOR ACTION, supra note 125, at 4. 
 333. See id. at 4–7; Supreme Court Orders, supra note 311 (listing several 
recent interim orders). 
 334. PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India) 
(May 2, 2003 interim order), available at 
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/may203.html. 
 335. See A TOOL FOR ACTION, supra note 125, at 4–7. 
2014] THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 55 
Supreme Court continued to locate a number of rights within 
the right to “live with dignity,” but instead of formulating and 
enforcing its own policy prescriptions to remedy violations of 
those rights, it simply held government policies to a reasona-
bleness standard. In this scenario, a “constitutionally declared 
right . . . of social citizenship would leave just about every ma-
jor issue of public policy still to be decided.”336 This would miti-
gate (if not eliminate) the democratic objection, as the court 
would leave it to the elected branches of government to make 
socioeconomic policy and would confine itself to simply judging 
the constitutionality of those policies under a relatively lenient 
standard of review. This is the approach adopted by the South 
African Constitutional Court.337 Compared to South Africa, so-
cioeconomic rights in India have been couched in very broad 
and obtuse terms by the Indian Supreme Court. The Court has 
not specified or placed any limiting principle on the rights that 
could be inferred under the “right to live with dignity.” It has 
also failed to establish a standard to review government socio-
economic policies.338 Together, these developments give the 
Court wide latitude to shape socioeconomic policy at the ex-
pense of democratic deliberation and compromise. Going for-
ward, the Indian Supreme Court would lessen the democratic 
objection if it were to clearly prescribe limits on the “right to 
live with dignity” and set forth a standard of review for socioec-
onomic policy schemes. However, this seems unlikely in light of 
judicially-created procedural innovations at every stage of liti-
gation that have allowed the Court to transform itself into a 
policymaking institution capable of affecting change on a large 
scale.339 As the “Right to Food” litigation shows, the Indian Su-
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preme Court, unlike its South African counterpart, does not 
simply declare government socioeconomic policy schemes un-
constitutional, but issues specific directions for how to fix those 
schemes that it enforces with interim orders.340 In light of 
Michelman’s proposed solution to the democratic objection—to 
move beyond courts and toward representative democracy in-
formed by directive principles and constrained by public rea-
son—the Indian Supreme Court’s approach of first locating so-
cioeconomic rights in the Constitution and then vigorously en-
forcing them is democratically problematic. 
Nevertheless, drawing from Rawls, even the Court’s strong 
exercise of judicial review is perhaps defensible “given certain 
historical circumstances and conditions of political culture” in 
India.341 While Rawls did not elaborate on what he meant here, 
he suggests that the need for judicial review (and perhaps also 
its scope) varies among societies based on “justice-related con-
cerns.”342 Thus, even in its strongest form, judicial review 
might be justified where the elected branches of government do 
not provide citizens with a “social minimum,”343 or violate the 
“difference principle” by failing to distribute resources to the 
greatest benefit of a society’s least-privileged members.344 
A full discussion of the history and politics of socioeconomic 
justice in India is beyond the scope of this Article,345 but one’s 
initial impression is that judicial review might be justified in 
light of certain facts. Historically, India has struggled with 
chronic poverty and malnourishment, which have not improved 
much over time.346 This lack of improvement is widely attribut-
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ed to rampant corruption at all levels of government.347 Studies 
on the right to food and the right to health have concluded that 
government schemes in these areas have failed because of brib-
ery, rent seeking, and other corrupt practices.348 
With respect to the right to food, the Supreme Court appoint-
ed a Committee headed by former Justice Wadhwa to investi-
gate the Public Distribution System (“PDS”). The PDS was ini-
tiated to ensure that adequate food reached poorer segments of 
Indian society at subsidized prices. The Committee, however, 
found that most of the food released at subsidized rates never 
reaches its intended recipients.349 It concluded that the impact 
of the PDS is “virtually non-existent on the ground and as a 
result, malpractices abound to the great discomfiture of the 
common man.”350 
Thus, the elected branches do not effectively provide a social 
minimum for many of its citizens, nor a just system of distribu-
tion. At first glance, then, historical circumstances and political 
conditions in India appear to justify the Supreme Court’s ro-
bust exercise of judicial review, even though it has increasingly 
limited democratic decision making. 
More fundamentally, such dysfunction in representative gov-
ernment calls into question the institutional assumptions on 
which the democratic objection is based. As David Landau ar-
gues, the idea that the legislature should operate in a separate 
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space from the judiciary assumes, inter alia, that the legisla-
ture is responsive to popular will, attuned to constitutional 
values, and has greater capacity than the judiciary—
assumptions that do not apply in developing countries like In-
dia.351 The judiciary’s role therefore should be judged in its in-
stitutional context. In India, this means accepting that the ju-
diciary acts as a political institution that gains democratic le-
gitimacy by exercising policymaking as well as judicial pow-
er.352 
V. THE CONTRACTARIAN OBJECTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS IN INDIA 
The Indian Supreme Court has assumed an increasingly 
prominent role in the formulation and enforcement of socioeco-
nomic policy through both substantive and procedural shifts in 
its jurisprudence. But has it set forth publicly acceptable rea-
sons to justify its decisions to relax procedural requirements 
under Article 32 of the Constitution and to make socioeconomic 
rights justiciable under Article 21? This is the central question 
posed by the contractarian objection. It shifts our focus from 
the Court’s role in India’s constitutional framework to the legit-
imacy of its decision-making process. 
The contractarian objection begins with the premise that a 
constitution’s legitimacy requires, at a minimum, that rational 
citizens (acting reasonably) understand its terms and can agree 
to be governed by them.353 If citizens cannot understand the 
terms or are unable to determine if their government or fellow 
citizens are complying with constitutional principles, they will 
not regard the constitution as a legitimate source of political 
authority.354 
To put this objection in the context of socioeconomic rights, 
recall that Rawls clearly differentiates between the first prin-
ciple of justice that sets out a scheme of basic liberties that are 
“constitutionally essential,” and the second principle, which 
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pertains to non-constitutionally essential questions of social 
and economic policy.355 A constitutional system can be legiti-
mate if it complies with a range of basic liberties, but nonethe-
less unjust for failing to pursue socioeconomic justice.356 
While the second principle is not constitutionally essential, it 
nonetheless pertains to what Rawls calls “basic justice” and is 
therefore governed by the constraint of public reason.357 This 
requires citizens and their public institutions to present each 
other with publicly acceptable reasons for their political views, 
to be willing to listen to others, and to display “fair-mindedness 
in deciding when accommodations to their views should rea-
sonably be made.”358 
The constraint of public reason applies more stringently to 
the Supreme Court.359 In many democratic societies, including 
India’s, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of constitutional 
interpretation. Its justices must articulate the best interpreta-
tion of the Constitution through reasoned opinions that are 
grounded in political values that reflect their best understand-
ing of the public conception of justice.360 Unlike ordinary citi-
zens or their elected representatives who deliberate on a range 
of policy issues, the justices are concerned with the higher 
(constitutional) law and matters of basic justice, and therefore 
must only use public reasons to explain their decisions.361 The 
need for the Court to explain its decisions through public rea-
sons is heightened with regard to socioeconomic rights. These 
rights “lack the trait of transparency,” as it is difficult to meas-
ure if they are being realized at any given moment.362 This lack 
of transparency accounts for one of the primary distinctions 
between the first and second principles. Rawls believes that in 
comparison to the second principle, “it is far easier to tell 
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whether . . . [Constitutional] essentials are realized.”363 He 
states that the realization of the second principle is “always 
open to reasonable differences of opinion . . . [it] depend[s] on 
inference and judgment in assessing complex social and eco-
nomic information.”364 Thus, Rawls argues that the first princi-
ple should apply “at the stage of the constitutional convention,” 
while issues of socioeconomic justice should be decided by 
elected representatives after the basic constitutional structure 
is in place.365 In essence, this is the structure adopted by the 
framers of the Indian Constitution. They set forth a scheme of 
basic liberties in Part III of the Constitution, followed by non-
justiciable Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV.366 The 
Indian Supreme Court altered this constitutional structure by 
interpreting Articles 21 and 32 to make socioeconomic rights 
justiciable and allow the Court to assume a central role in their 
enforcement. 
As the “exemplar of public reason,” the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions must reasonably comport with the text of the Constitu-
tion, constitutional precedents, and political understandings of 
the Constitution to articulate “a coherent constitutional view 
over the whole range of their decisions.”367 If its decisions do 
not meet these criteria, citizens might lose confidence that pub-
lic reason applies to decisions of socioeconomic justice and the 
“extant system of positive legal ordering is unjust.”368 More 
broadly, if citizens cannot understand what constitutionally 
essential provisions require, they will doubt the legitimacy of 
the whole constitutional system.369 
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With respect to Article 32, the Court’s decisions appear to fit 
within the constraint of public reason. As a preliminary matter, 
the text of Article 32 sets forth a flexible standard rather than 
a fixed rule that allows the Court some interpretive discre-
tion.370 It states that citizens may petition the Supreme Court 
via “appropriate proceedings” to obtain relief for violations of 
fundamental rights.371 As discussed in Part III, supra, the term 
“appropriate proceedings” originally limited standing to peti-
tioners directly affected by a challenged law. Yet, over time the 
Court loosened this requirement to accommodate petitions 
from any member of the public on behalf of disadvantaged in-
dividuals or groups.372 This interpretation is within the bounds 
of public reason because the phrase “appropriate proceedings” 
clearly sets forth a standard rather than a rule. All main-
stream theories of constitutional interpretation, with the ex-
ception of what Jack Balkin calls “original expected applica-
tion,”373 would accept that the phrase “appropriate proceedings” 
can (or even should) evolve over time.374 
The Court is also quite clear in its reasoning on this question 
of interpretation. For instance, in Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 
Justice Bhagwati states, 
There is no limitation in regard to the kind of proceeding en-
visaged in clause (1) of Article 32 except that the proceeding 
must be “appropriate” and this requirement of appropriate-
ness must be judged in the light of the purpose for which the 
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proceeding is to be taken, namely, enforcement of a funda-
mental right.375 
He goes on to state that the framers “did not lay down any par-
ticular form of proceeding . . . nor did they stipulate that such 
proceeding should conform to any rigid pattern or straight 
jacket,” since this would be “self-defeating because it would 
place enforcement of fundamental rights beyond the reach of 
the common man.”376 This justification depends on the very 
plausible premise that the framers knew that an open-ended 
provision was necessary in “a country like India, where there is 
so much of poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, deprivation and ex-
ploitation.”377 
Justice Bhagwati also described the changing nature of liti-
gation, where “Public Interest litigation is not in the nature of 
adversary litigation but it is a challenge and an opportunity to 
the government.”378 Here, Justice Bhagwati defends the Court’s 
evolving interpretation of Article 32 on the grounds that “ap-
propriate proceedings” should be interpreted according to the 
purpose of the litigation in question, and the purpose of public 
interest litigation, particularly in a country like India, is to al-
low ordinary citizens to approach the Court to hold the gov-
ernment accountable on matters of social justice. 
While this justification does not lessen (and might even rein-
force) the democratic objection,379 it overcomes the contractari-
an objection. The Court has interpreted Article 32 in a manner 
consistent with the text that recognizes the framers’ broader 
goals of social revolution,380 as well as the real need for PIL in 
India. This fulfills the constraint of public reason: the Court’s 
reasoning is transparent, clearly articulated, and is accessible 
to all Indian citizens in light of their own reasons.381 
The Court’s reasoning with regard to Article 21 is more prob-
lematic. The Court has interpreted the right to life expansively 
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to include a right to “live with dignity,” which includes a range 
of socioeconomic rights.382 However, the structure of the Indian 
Constitution clearly demarcates fundamental rights in Part III 
and directive principles in Part IV. More importantly, Article 
37 of the Constitution states that directive principles “shall not 
be enforceable by any court” even though these principles are 
“fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be 
the duty of the State to apply these principles in making 
laws.”383 Unlike Article 32, which uses a flexible standard, Ar-
ticle 37 sets forth a clear rule. The text of Article 37 is unam-
biguous and does not permit any deviation. Indeed, no major 
theory of constitutional interpretation would endorse a judicial 
interpretation of a bright-line rule that deviates from the plain 
meaning of the language of the text.384 
The Indian Supreme Court therefore has a heavy burden in 
justifying its deviation from the text of Article 37. In the semi-
nal cases that transformed the meaning of Article 21 into a 
broader right to live with dignity, the Court’s reasoning is in-
adequate—it either sidesteps or completely ignores the clear 
textual command of Article 37. 
In Maneka Gandhi, which first set out a broader interpreta-
tion of Article 21, the Court included substantial dicta about 
the right to life without providing any justification for these 
pronouncements. It says, for instance, that fundamental rights 
in Part III of the Constitution “represent the basic values cher-
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ished by the people of this country since the Vedic times and 
they are calculated to protect the dignity of the individual and 
create conditions in which every human being can develop his 
personality to the fullest extent.”385 
It then builds on these broad assertions in Francis Coralie, 
proclaiming that the right to life 
includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes 
along with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such as ade-
quate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, 
writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving 
about and mixing and commingling with fellow human be-
ings.386 
As with the excerpt from Maneka Gandhi, this definition of the 
right to life appears to be invented out of whole cloth, without 
reference to any precedent, constituent assembly debate, or 
other source of law. Moreover, both the Maneka Gandhi and 
the Francis Coralie decisions fail even to mention Article 37, 
much less explain how the Court got past the plain meaning of 
Article 37 when it reinterpreted Article 21 to make socioeco-
nomic rights justiciable.387 
Justice Bhagwati provided some hints as to the Court’s rea-
soning on this issue in the Bandhua Mukti Morcha case. First, 
he acknowledges that directive principles “are not enforceable 
in a court of law,” and the Court therefore cannot compel the 
government to pass laws or executive orders to meet socioeco-
nomic goals.388 Still, he adds that if the state has already 
passed legislation impacting socioeconomic justice, state actors 
“can certainly be obligated to ensure observance of such legisla-
tion for inaction on the part of the State in securing implemen-
tation of such legislation would amount to denial of the right to 
live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21.”389 
The distinction drawn here is illusory. Article 37 does not 
merely state that courts cannot compel the state to pass laws 
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or orders; it flatly prohibits the enforcement of directive princi-
ples. Justice Bhagwati does not put forth evidence to support 
his view that Article 37 is not intended to apply to judicial re-
view of existing laws. Further, even if the Court is permitted to 
review existing laws affecting socioeconomic policy, it has never 
clearly stated (in this case or otherwise) exactly to what stand-
ard the government is held.390 Additionally, as the “Right to 
Food” litigation demonstrates, the Court does not confine itself 
to a “reasonableness” or “minimum core” standard, but actually 
imposes its own policy prescriptions and timelines for comple-
tion on elected officials.391 
Justice Bhagwati’s opinion in Bandhua Mukti Morcha also 
states that certain directive principles (Articles 39, 41, and 42) 
provide Article 21 with its “life breath.”392 These articles direct 
the state to secure, inter alia, a fair economic system, adequate 
livelihood, education, public health access, and humane work-
ing conditions for all citizens.393 According to Justice Bhagwati, 
these principles constitute “the minimum requirements which 
must exist in order to enable a person to live with human dig-
nity.”394 The Court therefore implies a degree of interplay be-
tween Parts III and IV of the Constitution. It uses the directive 
principles to determine the scope and meaning of fundamental 
rights. Thus, Part IV of the Constitution is not justiciable on its 
own, but plays an important role in defining what the “right to 
life” encompasses.395 
This reasoning is flawed in light of the clear language in Ar-
ticle 37 prohibiting courts from enforcing directive principles. 
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Rather than enforcing them directly, the Supreme Court essen-
tially sidesteps this provision by enforcing the directive princi-
ples through a right to “live with dignity” in Article 21. Moreo-
ver, the Court does not place any limits on the scope of this 
right. While the Francis Coralie case lists only a few rights, in-
cluding the rights to adequate nutrition, food, and shelter,396 
the Court has since inferred that Article 21 protects the right 
to education,397 the right to a clean environment,398 and even 
rights that do not appear in the directive principles, such as 
the right to sleep.399 
Through its disregard for the text of Article 37 and its capa-
cious interpretation of Article 21, the Indian Supreme Court 
renders important Constitutional provisions inscrutable to In-
dian citizens. However, this contractarian objection was not 
inevitable. The Indian Supreme Court could have avoided this 
result by producing well-reasoned and circumscribed judg-
ments. As discussed earlier, South Africa does not face this 
problem because its constitutional court is limited to enforcing 
clearly defined, narrowly couched socioeconomic rights that are 
enumerated in the South African Constitution.400 The Indian 
Constitution, by contrast, lists directive principles that are ex-
plicitly nonjusticiable under Article 37. The Indian Supreme 
Court has not explained how it moved past Article 37’s plain 
meaning. There is no articulated standard of judicial review or 
limit to the scope of the right to life under Article 21. The Court 
therefore fails to meet the constraint of public reason in its 
judgments on socioeconomic rights. 
The right to “live with dignity” is indeterminate; any number 
of positive entitlements might be deemed essential to human 
dignity, and any government policy in this area might be ruled 
unconstitutional for reasons that rational and reasonable citi-
zens could not discern or predict with any certainty. Thus, citi-
zens may no longer accept the Constitution as a legitimate 
source of political authority. 
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CONCLUSION: TOWARD A BROADER CONCEPTION OF LEGITIMACY 
Since the adoption of the Indian Constitution in 1950, the ju-
diciary, led by the Supreme Court, has greatly increased its 
policymaking authority. The Court not only expanded the 
meaning of Article 21 to make socioeconomic rights justiciable 
under the Constitution, but also oversaw several modifications 
to fundamental rights litigation under Article 32.401 Three sig-
nificant changes emerge from the Court’s approach: (1) the ju-
diciary can enforce a greater number of rights; (2) through re-
laxed standing rules, public interest groups and concerned citi-
zens may file petitions under Article 32; and (3) courts have 
become significant players in formulating and enforcing socio-
economic policy. The first change is substantive, the latter two 
are procedural. 
This Article has set forth two objections to these changes. The 
democratic objection arises from the Court’s transformation 
into a policymaking institution such that there is potentially no 
issue of public policy that it cannot reach or government 
scheme that it cannot review. The contractarian objection is 
narrower—it asks whether the reasons put forward by the 
Court to justify its decisions on socioeconomic rights meet the 
constraint of public reason. 
The Article’s theoretical framework offers at least two major 
benefits as a lens through which to examine socioeconomic 
rights in India. First, it distinguishes between two sorts of cri-
tiques: (1) those pertaining to the Supreme Court’s role in In-
dia’s constitutional framework, and (2) those involving the 
Court’s substantive interpretation of the Constitution and the 
resulting problem with legitimacy. This distinction is potential-
ly useful in light of the current literature in this area. While 
some scholars elide this distinction by criticizing the Supreme 
Court’s policymaking role in terms of legitimacy,402 others focus 
only on the democratic objection.403 
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The democratic objection implicates both the substantive and 
procedural changes described above, as the Court today does 
not simply adjudicate on a greater number of issues, but has 
become the central forum for social movements and public in-
terest organizations to affect far-reaching policy changes with 
regard to socioeconomic justice.404 
The contractarian objection, though, forces us to distinguish 
among the substantive and procedural changes in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. While all three changes contribute to the demo-
cratic objection, the contractarian objection only arises in re-
sponse to substantive changes—namely, the Court’s broad 
reading of Article 21 (and disregard for Article 37) to make so-
cioeconomic rights justiciable. As discussed, the Court’s inter-
pretation of Article 21 is not justified by the text or clearly ex-
plained in the Court’s opinions and therefore fails to meet the 
constraint of public reason. 
However, the procedural changes are not problematic from a 
contractarian perspective. The Court’s expansive interpretation 
of Article 32 is reasonable under this provision’s open-ended 
language. The Court’s decisions to allow a wider class of citi-
zens to file writ petitions, to allow special commissions to un-
dertake fact-finding, or to empower courts to issue and enforce 
detailed interim orders are also explained with clear and pub-
licly accessible reasons. Thus, while many look at these sub-
stantive and procedural changes as coterminous elements with-
in the broader development of PIL, the contractarian view 
shows that they are distinct in this important respect. 
A second benefit of this Article’s theoretical framework is 
that it steps back from analyzing the political effects of Su-
                                                          
The court has been charged not only with exceeding its institutional 
capacity, but with reversing constitutional priorities, usurping both 
legislative and administrative functions, violating the rule of law, 
riding roughshod over traditional rights and succumbing to the cor-
rupting temptations of power. Such criticisms are ordinarily couched 
in the language of legitimacy. 
Id. 
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 404. See Baxi, supra note 6, at 107–11. 
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preme Court judgments to examine the process of the Court’s 
decision making. The current academic literature on socioeco-
nomic rights under the Indian Constitution is concerned pri-
marily with the effects of Supreme Court judgments on, inter 
alia, the Court’s legitimacy, India’s separation of powers 
framework, and Indian society at large.405 Those who defend 
the Court’s exercise of judicial review have relied on the failure 
of elected representatives to improve socioeconomic conditions 
to justify the Court’s intervention into matters of policy.406 
Others, echoing the democratic objection, have criticized what 
they believe is the judiciary’s usurpation of legislative and ex-
ecutive authority.407 Their disagreement appears to rest on di-
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vergent views as to the appropriate role of the judiciary in a 
democratic society—views that probably cannot be reconciled. 
Even from the Rawlsian perspective, it is open to interpreta-
tion whether the Indian Supreme Court’s robust use of judicial 
review is justified in Indian society, though a strong case can 
be mounted for the Court in light of historical and political cir-
cumstances.408 
By looking at the Supreme Court’s decisions on socioeconomic 
rights through the lens of public reason, this Article has fo-
cused on whether the Court’s decision-making process is wor-
thy of acceptance by Indian citizens. And, in short, it might not 
be worthy: the Court fails to provide clear and transparent rea-
sons to justify its interpretations of Articles 21 and 37.409 As a 
result, Indian citizens could not understand constitutionally 
essential provisions with any clarity or conviction, which might 
prevent them from assenting to be governed under this Consti-
tution. The Court’s judgments in this area therefore threaten 
the legitimacy of the present constitutional order. 
This article’s claim that the legitimacy of the Indian constitu-
tional order is threatened by the Supreme Court’s enforcement 
of socioeconomic rights might appear counterintuitive. After 
all, it seems to conflict with the fact that the Court is one of the 
few Indian public institutions that shows the will and the ca-
pacity to actually improve the lot of the least privileged mem-
                                                          
spacious plea that non-enforcement is violative of article 21, perhaps 
no state activity can be spared from the purview of the Supreme 
Court as a PIL matter. Its logical extension could mean the taking 
over of the total administration of the country from the executive by 
the Court. 
Id. 
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bers of society.410 The Supreme Court enjoys widespread sup-
port among Indian citizens who approach the Court in large 
numbers to obtain various sorts of relief against the govern-
ment.411 The public also views the judiciary as one of the least 
corrupt state institutions.412 Moreover, Supreme Court judg-
ments on socioeconomic rights have brought about positive 
change—the “Right to Food” litigation, for instance, provides 
midday meals to schoolchildren across India.413 
From a broader perspective, taking a social contractarian 
view of the Indian Constitution presents an opportunity to re-
think our conception of legitimacy. Specifically, in the context 
of socioeconomic rights, this view proposes that a legitimate 
constitutional system demands not only acceptable institution-
al arrangements and policy-related outcomes, but also that 
public institutions, particularly the Supreme Court, are held to 
a strict, process-based standard—they must present clear and 
transparent reasons for their decisions that are accessible to all 
citizens in light of their common reason. 
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